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ABSTRACT
The model-based design for embedded real-time systems utilizes the verifiable reusable compo-
nents and proper architectures, to deal with the scalability problem caused by state-explosion. In
this dissertation, we address verification approaches for both low-level individual component cor-
rectness and high-level system correctness, which are equally important under this scheme. Three
prototype tools are developed, implementing our approaches and algorithms accordingly.
For the component-level design-time verification, we developed a symbolic verifier, LhaVrf, for
the reachability verification of concurrent linear hybrid systems (LHA). It is unique in translating a
hybrid automaton into a transition system that preserves the discrete transition structure, possesses
no continuous dynamics, and preserves reachability of discrete states. Afterwards, model-checking
is interleaved in the counterexample fragment based specification relaxation framework. We next
present a simulation-based bounded-horizon reachability analysis approach for the reachability ver-
ification of systems modeled by hybrid automata (HA) on a run-time basis. This framework applies
a dynamic, on-the-fly, repartition-based error propagation control method with the mild require-
ment of Lipschitz continuity on the continuous dynamics. The novel features allow state-triggered
discrete jumps and provide eventually constant over-approximation error bound for incremental sta-
ble dynamics. The above approaches are implemented in our prototype verifier called HS3V. Once
the component properties are established, the next thing is to establish the system-level properties
through compositional verification. We present our work on the role and integration of quantifier
elimination (QE) for property composition and verification. In our approach, we derive in a single
step, the strongest system property from the given component properties for both time-independent
and time-dependent scenarios. The system initial condition can also be composed, which, alongside
the strongest system property, are used to verify a postulated system property through induction.
The above approaches are implemented in our prototype tool called ReLIC.
1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
As embedded real-time systems become more and more complex and mission- or safety-critical,
there is a recent trend to raise the level of abstraction to the model-level. Model-based design utilizes
the verifiable reusable components and proper architectures, to deal with the verification scalability
problem caused by state-explosion. Thus, ensuring low-level individual component correctness and
high-level system correctness are equally important under this scheme.
For example, in a distributed Cyber-Physical System (CPS) as shown in Figure 1.1, control units
are distributed, collecting sensor measurements driven by the underlying physical dynamics, com-
manding target actuators, while interacting/communicating through an embedded bus/network.
To formally specify the entire system architecture, AADL (standardized by SAE) [1] can capture
the architecture of software, computing/communication hardware/medium, and physical compo-
nents, together with their behavior models, and other constraints.
Figure 1.1: A distributed CPS
Verification techniques of such CPSs are manifold and varying across different types of compo-
nents and the system according to the modeling and design/operation stages. In this dissertation,
we present our work on (i) component-level design-time verification, (ii) component-level runtime
verification, and (iii) system-level design-time compositional reasoning.
2In a model-based system, examples of mathematical objects often used to model system com-
ponents in design-time are: Extended/Timed Automata for discrete real-time behaviors in the
software/computation/communication components and Stochastic Hybrid Automata for the phys-
ical components (those are subject to noise), etc. We have developed a symbolic verifier, LhaVrf,
for the symbolic reachability verification of concurrent linear hybrid systems. A concurrent linear
hybrid automaton is composed of a set of linear hybrid automata that interact through shared
variables and/or events. A linear hybrid automaton is first translated to a purely discrete linear
transition system that preserves the reachability of discrete states (locations). Its analysis can
be conducted in the proposed counterexample fragment based specification relaxation (CEFSR)
framework, where an invalid fragment (a subsequence) of a counterexample is used to eliminate
the entire set of counterexamples sharing the same fragment, by way of specification relaxation
(as opposed to the more traditional, model refinement). In the concurrent system setting, we pro-
pose further enhancement towards scalability as follows. For each spurious counterexample, an
unsatisfiable core associated with it that makes the counterexample invalid, is identified and used
for specification relaxation. This results in eliminating the entire set of spurious counterexamples
sharing the same unsatisfiable core in a single iteration. Our implementation of LhaVrf adopts
the above key ideas, with the capability of automatically translating the hybrid automata into
discrete transition system, composing the concurrent model, and using SMT solver for validating
counterexamples and fast-searching for the unsatisfiable core. The verification approach and the
prototype verifier are illustrated via an application to the Fischer mutual exclusion protocol in
Chapter 2.
In all safety-critical applications, we need to know on a run-time basis, whether the system un-
der consideration will remain safe in a bounded future (corresponding to the reaction time required
to take any corrective actions). One approach to bounded-time safety is the computation of the
reach set over that horizon. Hybrid system verification tools based on reachability analysis incur
over-approximation errors or have restrictions on the class of systems they can handle. In Chap-
ter 3, we present a simulation-based bounded-horizon verification framework for general systems
3modeled by hybrid automata, with a mild requirement of Lipschitz continuity on the continuous
dynamics. In this framework, the bounded initial set is covered by a finite set of representative
states, whose forward simulations are used to generate an overapproximation of all the reachable
states of the initial states. A novel feature of our approach is that the representative states are
generated dynamically, on-the-fly, while the forward simulations are being performed. This is a key
innovation introduced in the paper that refines the current “reachability-face” by a new partition
only when needed. Our approach works for general class of hybrid systems with state-triggered
discrete jumps and also allows piecewise constant bounded inputs, extending the existing work
that applied to switched systems, that did not have state-triggered discrete jumps (switching was
time-based and known a priori), and had no inputs. Additionally, when a dynamical system is
incremental (input-to-state) stable, our algorithm that uses a simple Lipschitz-based discrepancy
function provides an eventually constant error bound of over-approximation. This is indeed of
practical significance since a Lipschitz-based discrepancy function is easily computable, while a
more precise discrepancy function may not be available, but if it is, our algorithm can also utilize
it. As a consequence of the constant error bound, owing to incremental (input-to-state) stability,
the number of representative simulations also converges to a constant. We have developed a pro-
totype verifier, HS3V, implementing our algorithms and providing verification results from several
benchmarks to show its effective performance.
Last by not least, one central goal of model-based development is to enable analysis of the sys-
tem. System-level properties are often expected to be derived from the compositional reasoning of
the requirements on the components to be implemented and/or the verified properties of reusable
elements. To achieve that, we look into taking advantage of state-of-art technologies on compo-
sitional verification, currently focusing on discrete-state systems (cyber part of CPS). Quantifier
elimination (QE) is a powerful technique for gaining insight, through simplification, into problems
involving logic expressions in various theories. We present our work in Chapter 4 on the role and
integration of QE for compositional verification. In contrast to the current proof-based approach
as for example in AGREE [2], in our QE-based approach, we derive in a single step, the strongest
4system contract from the given component contracts. This formalism is first developed for time-
independent contracts, and later also extended to the case of time-dependent property composition.
The extension to the time-dependent/temporal case requires additional work, namely, replicating
the given properties by shifting those along time so the entire time-horizon of interest is captured.
We show that the time-horizon (or order) of a system property is bounded by the sum of the time-
horizons (or orders) of the component properties. The initial conditions of the components are also
composed to obtain the system-level initial condition, which, alongside the inferred strongest system
property, is used to verify a postulated system property through induction. We implemented our
above approaches in a new prototype tool called ReLIC (Reduced Logic Inference for Composition)
and demonstrated it through several examples. Additionally, in a k-induction [3] based model-
checking approach, the verification problems of the base and inductive steps can be reduced to the
QE problems in which all the variables are existentially quantified. Thus such a model-checker can
be extended with QE tools to provide back-end solver options. Our implementation of integrating
the QE tool Redlog [4] with the model-checker JKind showed the successful resolution of a nonlin-
ear computation (emanating from a fuzzy logic operation) that the SMT-solver supported JKind
[5] was unable to resolve. Thus the QE-integrated solver can provide an alternative option to a
model-checker.
Chapter 5 gives the conclusion.
5CHAPTER 2. VERIFICATION USING COUNTEREXAMPLE
FRAGMENT BASED SPECIFICATION RELAXATION: CASE OF
MODULAR/CONCURRENT LINEAR HYBRID AUTOMATA
2.1 Introduction
A typical cyber-physical system (CPS) exhibits complex behaviors caused by interleaving dis-
crete transitions guided by discrete control actions or constraints, and continuous dynamics gov-
erned by underlining ordinary differential equations. Hybrid automaton (HA) [6, 7] has become a
widely accepted choice for CPSs by integrating discrete transitions with continuous dynamics. An
HA consists of multiple discrete modes. In each mode, a set of real-valued variables evolve according
to specified flow dynamics and invariant, while the mode switches and value resets are guided by
guards and jumps. An HA is called Linear Hybrid Automaton (LHA) when its flow dynamics, flow
invariants, transition guards and jump conditions are all constrained by linear predicates.
In the domain of safety verification of hybrid systems, one seeks to prove or disprove a system’s
reachability to a set of unsafe states, given its initial states and dynamics. Some systems require
safety at each moment, while for some other systems, the safe behavior is required to be main-
tained over a bounded time, but on a runtime basis. Normally, the reachability analysis requires
the computation of the reachable set, and in the presence of continuous dynamics, this is typically
undecidable. However, semi-decision algorithms can be developed under counterexample-guided
abstraction refinement (CEGAR) [8] framework, by employing symbolic model checking over the
finite-state abstractions, together with the iterative refinements to eliminate the spurious coun-
terexamples. In case of the termination of a CEGAR algorithm, either the system is proven to be
safe or a concrete counterexample is produced.
Parts of the work presented here was first reported in [9, 10], whereas we introduced an en-
hanced CEGAR-based algorithm for the verification of a class of hybrid systems modeled by LHAs.
6Our work is unique in translating an LHA into a linear transition system (LTS) that preserves the
discrete transition structure, possesses no continuous dynamics, and also preserves the reachability
of discrete states (locations). Note checking the reachability of discrete locations suffices for verify-
ing a class of safety specifications for which the model can be “refined against the specification” to
reduce it to checking the unreachability of certain unsafe locations (locations, whose reachability
implies the specification violation). The extension of the translation approach to general hybrid
systems with inputs and outputs was later presented in [11]. The translation reduces the discrete
state reachability problem of the original LHA to the one of the corresponding LTS. The safety
property of the LTS is examined starting with the underlying discrete state automaton as the ab-
stract model. There are several advantages of specification relaxation as opposed to the standard
abstract model refinement: (i) Firstly, specification relaxation is more straightforward than model
refinement, since all that needs to be done is to encode the counterexample to relax the specification,
so in a next round it can no longer remain a counterexample; (ii) in fact in our approach we identify
an unsatisfiable core (unsat-core) that is the minimal conflicting constraint set (see [10, 12]) over
the constraints derived from a counterexample path. By using the encoding of the “unsat-core” to
relax the specification, we are able to rule out an entire set of counterexamples possessing the same
“unsat-core”; (iii) since there is no change in the underlying abstract model, the counterexamples
of newer iterations can still be interpreted over the same underlying discrete graph structure, aid-
ing the understanding of the counterexample. We refer to our approach counterexample fragment
based specification relaxation (CEFSR). We also developed a prototype tool LhaVrf, based on the
approach described above and extending the initial development reported in [12]: The symbolic
model checker NuSMV is integrated for model checking, whereas the SMT (satisfiability modulo the-
ory) solver Z3 [13] is integrated for counterexample validation and unsat-core identification. Our
contributions that integrate past works and recent enhancements are summarized as follows:
• We provide a systematic method for the translation from LHA to a purely discrete abstraction
LTS, that preserves the discrete behaviors (sequences of discrete states visited), and thereby
also the safety and reachability properties.
7• We have developed a framework for the safety verification of LHA, utilizing the LHA to
LTS translation, called CEFSR (counterexample fragment based specification relaxation), in
which a counterexample fragment is used for relaxing the safety specification as opposed to
for refining the abstract model, and as explained in a next bullet multiple counterexamples
are eliminated in a single iteration.
• To enhance scalability, an unsatisfiable core of a counterexample is identified, and encoded
for specification relaxation so as to eliminate an entire set of spurious counterexamples that
possess the same unsatisfiable core constraint set.
• We have developed an automated safety verification tool LhaVrf for concurrent LHA, based
on the above techniques. The tool is integrated with NuSMV for model-checking, and with
SMT solver Z3 for counterexample validation and unsatisfiable core identification.
• The tool is validated with a system possessing 10 components, each with 4 locations, implying
an overall locations space of size 410 = ∼1M , and about ∼13M discrete transitions, validating
the scalability of the approach and the tool.
• Finally, while the algorithm is presented in the domain of LHA, the tool’s capability is ex-
tended to more general hybrid automaton allowing nonlinear guard/jump conditions (flows
are still constrained by rectangular predicates).
This chapter extends the conference version [12] in multiple ways. First, a new section on related
works from the literature is added, covering recent and historical development of algorithms and
tools with respect to both (variable) state and location reachability analysis for hybrid systems.
Secondly, we upgraded the tool LhaVrf by integrating the state-of-the-art SMT solver Z3. Z3 is used
for counterexample validation to replace the previously implemented Linear Programming solver
via Microsoft Solver Foundation, allowing LhaVrf to be more scalable and extend its capability to
handle nonlinear constraints for guards/jumps. Z3 is further used for identifying the unsatisfiable
core for a spurious counterexample using its built-in command “unsat-core”, replacing the previous
bisection based search algorithm, making the tool much more computationally efficient. Lastly, an
experiment on a 10-process Fischer mutual exclusion protocol is added to show the scalability.
8Rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents related works from the literature.
Section 2.3 provides notations and preliminaries. Section 2.4 gives the implementation details of
the LhaVrf. An illustrative example of its application to the Fischer mutual exclusion protocol is
provided in Section 2.4.2.
2.2 Related Works
2.2.1 Symbolic Set-based Reachability Analysis
It is usually undecidable to compute the reachable set, except for certain subclass of LHAs that
for example include timed automata, and initialized rectangular automata, etc. For clarification,
the flow dynamics of LHA in this dissertation is rectangular, i.e., of the form x˙ ∈ [a, b], where a,
b are constants. Polyhedral flow representation is also used, e.g., first by the tool HyTech [14], for
simple reason that polyhedral regions are invariant under linear discrete and continuous transitions.
For continuous dynamics described by linear differential equations of form x˙ = ax + b, where
a, b are constant, the analytical solution for x is an exponential curve. Some literature [7, 15, 16,
17] employ the term Linear Hybrid System (LHS) to denote a hybrid automaton with such flow
and linear invariants, guards and jumps. For LHS, although the reachable set, starting from a
polyhedron, is also a polyhedron at any given moment, but the entire region of reachable states
over time is not. Systems with nonlinear dynamics have more complicated continuous behaviors
that often rule out analytical solutions. It is possible to use polyhedron representation for over-
approximating the reachable set for both LTSs and nonlinear hybrid automata. In such scenarios,
the over-approximation of overall reachable set grows by either expanding the current polyhedron
zone, or adding new polyhedra for each time interval to construct flow pipes/tubes. Usually, better
precision can be achieved by lowering the size of time intervals. In practice, the choice of time
interval usually depends on the trade-off between demanded accuracy and computational cost.
The tool d/dt [18] tries to expand the polyhedron that contains the overall reachable set by
lifting its faces outwards for a certain distance based on the vector field along the faces for each time
interval [19]. However, the expansion may produce unboundedly large over-approximation. Instead
9of computing the over-approximation of the overall reachable set, the later tools focused on the
reachable sets in the sequential time intervals. For each time interval [tk, tk+1], CheckMate [20] first
computes the convex hull of the polyhedron vertices at tk and tk+1, then bloats this convex hull along
the directions of the normal vectors to its faces to compute the minimal convex set containing the
reachable set in [tk, tk+1]. This reduces to a non-convex optimization problem solved numerically
by MATLAB numerical package. C2E2 [21, 22], developed for verification of annotated hybrid
systems and Stateflow models, blows a simulation trace to a reachtube (consecutive polyhedron over-
approximation for sequential time intervals) to represent a group of executions within a close enough
neighborhood loosely bounded by Lipschitz property of the continuous dynamics. If possible,
annotations to the dynamics are used to derive so-called discrepancy functions that provide less
conservative bounds on the error of the reachtube than Lipschitz-based ones. Recent version of
C2E2 supports on-the-fly discrepancy function computation based on local optimization [23, 24].
Support function [25, 26] is another form for representing the reachable set, developed since 2009
for hybrid systems with piecewise affine continuous dynamics. Given the fact that any convex set is
the intersection of a set of half-spaces, represented using normal vectors and distance values, a large
class of sets such as unit ball, ellipsoid, zonotope, etc. can be represented by support functions in
a compact manner. Further, more complex sets can be obtained using linear mapping, convex hull,
Minkowski sum operations etc. on elementary convex sets. These operations on support functions
are used to compute the post-image of a currently computed reachable set. Due to the expres-
sive compactness and computational effectiveness of the support functions, SpaceEx [27, 28], that
adopted this technique, has increased the scope of linear systems that can be verified to several hun-
dreds of state variables. SpaceEx recently combines Zonotope representation for the input solution
of a linear system with the support function representation of the affine solution [29], to balance
the approximation error and scalability during flowpipe construction, as well as reduce complexity
of handling time-triggered switching. For state-triggered discrete transitions, support functions are
not efficient on intersection and deciding containment – operations often used in determining if a
guard is triggered or an invariant/safety condition is violated. Thus, SpaceEx has to also mix in
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the polyhedral representation into the verification algorithm, making the extra over-approximating
translations during the discrete transitions. Errors introduced during frequent discrete transitions
may become a major bottleneck for precision in SpaceEx. Improvement has been done on elimi-
nating spurious discrete transitions caused by conservative over-approximation involving template
polyhedra, and checking the existence of a hyperplane that separates the guard set from the flow-
pipe [30]. A model translation technique implemented by Hyst [31, 32] is used to alleviate the
same problem using a different approach. Hyst over-approximates the original frequently switching
continuously-controlled system with a continuously-controlled system with an additional bounded
non-deterministic input, resulting in the so-called continuization, which eliminates a large number
of discrete transitions, thereby eliminating error growth caused by frequent translations between
the aforementioned two types of representations occurring at the discrete transitions.
Taylor Model (TM) [33, 34], also developed since 2009, tightly encloses a flow of a differentiable
function, expressed by its Taylor polynomial of degree up to k, bloated by an interval representing
higher order reminder terms over a time interval. With proper interval-based techniques and se-
mantically derived TM arithmetic operations, the tool Flow* [35] is able to construct TM flowpipes,
i.e., the reachable sets of continuous nonlinear dynamics in sequential time intervals. As a result,
TMs can provide guaranteed over-approximation to the solutions of ordinary differential equations
(ODEs). For nonlinear dynamics, high accuracy demands higher order TMs, which in turn increases
the number of parameters to be computed, often consuming significant resources. Instead of using
an unified and fixed order for all state variables, one improvement is to adjust the TM order on-the-
fly depending on the local varying rate for each state variable independently. Adaptive TM orders,
along with adaptive time intervals were added as new features in the recent version of Flow* [36].
Because of the similar complications as SpaceEx for handling the intersections operation, Flow*
also needs to translate between the TMs and the other effective representations back and forth. It
is possible that Flow* could also benefit from using Hyst as a model preprocessing tool to alleviate
this translational problem, especially for in case of frequently switching dynamics.
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Despite the diversiform representation of reachable set, most state-of-the-art verification tools
have been advancing by digging into the knowledge of nonlinear dynamics in Control Theory,
searching for annotations and parameters that diminish the over-approximation error bound with-
out exhausting computation resources. Readers can refer to [23, 24, 36, 37, 38] for further technical
details. In contrast, a recently developed tool HS3V [39] (see Chapter 3) for verification of general
nonlinear hybrid automata proposed a different approach on over-approximation error propagation
control. HS3V is built upon simulation-based over-approximation framework. Its unique idea is to
suppress the existing error periodically by dynamic repartitions and simulations on-the-fly. Be-
cause a repartition makes the existing error covered by multiple simulations (therefore more finely
gridded) instead of the only one from the initial partition, even with very conservative error bound
based on Lipschitz property which grows exponentially in between repartitions, the accumulated
error “tightened up”, or even gets suppressed to zero as time approaches infinity if the dynamics
happens to be convergent. Regardless of how the error accumulates, this feature often results in a
good error bound not only for complex nonlinear hybrid systems without any (usually hard-to-get)
annotations from the users, but also for frequently switching dynamics.
2.2.2 Model Checking and Counterexample-Guided Abstraction Refinement
Another thread in hybrid system verification focuses on systems where the unsafe behavior
is represented by a set of discrete unsafe locations. The major effort in safety verification is
discretization-based over-approximation and the reliance on symbolic model checking [40] based
on BDD and SAT [41]. In this context, CEGAR [8] has been proved to be successful. It involves
iterations consisting of system abstraction, symbolic model checking, counterexample validation
and abstraction-refinement. While there are some powerful tools for symbolic model checking, e.g.,
NuSMV and SPIN, which are commonly integrated in many CEGAR algorithms, these algorithms
may vary on the abstraction-refinement schemes. In [16, 42], the abstraction of an LHA is a low-
dimensional LHA constructed using a subset of the continuous variables from the original LHA.
Model checking is done on its discrete transition graph. Once a spurious counterexample is identi-
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fied by solving the constraints along the path of the original LHA using Linear Programing, a subset
of the variables that preserves the infeasibility of the counterexample is selected then added to the
set of variables used thus far to construct a new abstracted LHA. Abstraction gets refined in each
iteration and excludes previously discovered spurious counterexamples. This incremental variable
set abstraction allows users to diagnose and twist design parameters so as to eliminate undesirable
behaviors. The tool HARE [43] abstracts a rectangular hybrid automaton via the following opera-
tions: collapsing the control states and transitions, dropping the continuous variables and scaling
the variables. In the end, the abstract model is an initialized rectangular automaton and may have
different discrete transition graph from the original model. HARE makes calls to HyTech to analyze
abstract model and generate counterexamples. Since the reachability problem on the initialized
rectangular automata is proven to be decidable, HyTech guarantees termination on the abstract
model. Then upon the analysis to the spurious counterexample, HARE refines the abstraction by
splitting control states/transitions, and/or adding variables that may have new dynamics (due to
scaling). In general, HARE carries out a CEGAR framework with symbolic reachability analysis
replacing symbolic model checking.
The complex behaviors of hybrid systems has attracted researchers with varying approaches,
beyond the scope of methodologies and tools covered in the section above. These include phase-
portrait adopted by PHAVer [44], theorem proving by KeYmaera [45], SMT-based techniques (e.g.
BMC, k-induction) by HyComp [17] and Passel [46], to name a few. [15, 47, 48] further provide
literature review on hybrid system verification technologies and tools.
2.3 Notation and Preliminary
2.3.1 Linear Hybrid Automaton (LHA)
Let V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} be a set of real-valued variables and ~v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn) be their
vector representation. A convex linear predicate over V is a finite boolean conjunction of linear
inequalities over V . For a linear predicate φ and a valuation ~a over ~v, we write φ[~v := ~a] for
the truth value obtained by evaluating φ with the constant ai replacing in φ all occurrences of
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the variable vi. Every linear predicate φ over ~v defines a set [φ] ⊆ Rn of valuations such that
[φ] = {~a ∈ Rn | φ[~v := ~a] = true}.
Definition 1. A linear hybrid automaton is a tuple A = (L, V,Σ, E, Init, f low, inv, guard, jump)
consisting of the following components:
• L is a finite set of locations,
• V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} is a finite set of real-valued variables. The state space of A is L × Rn.
Each state thus has the form (l,~a), where l ∈ L is the discrete part of the state and ~a ∈ Rn
is the continuous part,
• Σ is a finite set of events,
• E ⊆ L× Σ× L is the set of discrete transitions,
• Init ⊆ L× Rn is the set of initial states,
• flow is the flow function that assigns each location l ∈ L a convex linear predicate flow(l)
over ~˙v that constrains the rates at which the values of variables change within the set [flow(l)],
• inv is the invariant function that assigns each location l ∈ L a convex linear predicate inv(l)
over ~v that constrains the values of variables within the set [inv(l)],
• guard is the guard function that assigns each transition e = (l, σ, l′) ∈ E a convex linear
predicate guard(e) over ~v such that e is enabled at state (l,~a) only if ~a ∈ [guard(e)],
• jump is the jump function that assigns each transition e = (l, σ, l′) ∈ E a convex linear
predicate jump(e) over ~v and ~v′ such that if e is taking place from state (l,~a) to state (l′,~a′),
then (~a,~a′) ∈ [jump(e)], i.e., jump(e)[~v := ~a,~v′ := ~a′] = true.
We use subscript to denote the position of a specific element in a vector, and superscript to
differentiate valuations of a variable at different occasions . A run in A is a (finite or infinite)
sequence r = (l0,~a0)(l1,~a1) . . . (li,~ai) . . . such that there exists a sequence of events σ0σ1 . . . σi . . .
satisfying following properties:
• ∀i ≥ 0, (li, σi, li+1) ∈ E,
• There exists a sequence of non-negative real numbers t0t1 . . . ti . . . and a sequence of functions
~˙x0~˙x1 . . . ~˙xi . . . , where ∀i ≥ p, ~˙xi : [0, ti]→ Rn such that
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– ∀i ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [0, ti], ~˙xi(t) ∈ [flow(li)],
– ∀i ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [0, ti], (~ai + ∫ ti0 ~˙xi(t)dt) ∈ [inv(li)],
– ∀i ≥ 0, (~ai + ∫ ti0 ~˙xi(t)dt) ∈ [guard((li, σi, li+1))],
– ∀i ≥ 0, jump((li, σi, li+1))[~v := ~ai + ∫ ti0 ~˙xi(t)dt,~v′ := ~ai+1] = true.
Remark 1. In this dissertation, the terminology linear hybrid automaton (LHA) is used to mean
differently from a linear hybrid system (LHS): In LHA, the flow rates are linearly constrained. In
contrast, by LHS we mean a system where the flow rate is governed by a linear ordinary differential
equations (ODE). Such definitions are also adopted elsewhere, as [7, 15, 16, 17].
Example 1. The Fischer mutual exclusion protocol is used to guarantee mutual exclusion for shared
resources in a concurrent system consisting of a number of processes. Each process i is assumed
to have a local clock modeled by the variable v i. The global variable n is used to coordinate the
access to the critical section. The LHA model Proc i (to distinguish from the location A i) for the
ith process is shown in Figure 2.1. There are two global positive real-valued parameters D1 and D2
in the model. D1 represents the upper bound on the time that each process could take in changing
the shared variable to its own number, and D2 represents the lower bound for the time that each
process must wait before it can check the variable value again.
Figure 2.1: LHA model Proc i for process i in the Fischer protocol
Proc i = (L i, V i,Σ i, E i, Init i, f low i, inv i, guard i, jump i) is the LHA model for
the ith process, where
15
• L i = {I i, R i, C i, A i},
• V i = {v i, n},
• Σ i = ∅,
• E i, Init i, flow i, inv i, guard i and jump i are clear from Figure 2.1.
2.3.2 Linear Transition System (LTS) and Translation of LHA into LTS
In this section we introduce the notion of a linear transition system (LTS) that is a purely
discrete-state system, and present a translation from an LHA to an LTS to obtain a discrete-
state abstraction that preserves the set of discrete behaviors (sequences of discrete states visited),
including the reachability of discrete states (see Theorem 1). Note the LTS model does not possess
any continuous dynamics. This is a key contribution of our approach. Under this equivalence, a
reachability check over LHA can be reduced to an equivalent reachability/safety check over the
LTS, while a counterexample validation is reduced to a standard linear programming (since LHAs
are only endowed with linear predicates).
Definition 2. A linear transition system is a tuple S = (L, V,Σ, E, Init, P ), where L, V,Σ, E and
Init are the same as in Definition 1, and P is the transition relation function that assigns each
transition in E a convex linear predicate over {v1, v2, . . . , vn, v′1, v′2, . . . , v′n}, i.e., ∀e = (l, σ, l′) ∈
E,P : e 7→ pe(~v,~v′), which relates the variable values at locations l and l′.
A run in S is a (finite or infinite) sequence r = (l0,~a0)(l1,~a1) . . . (li,~ai) . . . such that there exists
a sequence of σ0σ1 . . . σi . . . , ∀i ≥ 0, (li, σi, li+1) ∈ E and p(li,σi,li+1)[~v := ~ai, ~v′ := ~ai+1] = true.
In the following we discuss the translation from an LHA to its discrete-state abstracted LTS, in
which continuous state vector ~v− (respectively, ~v+) represents the values just before (respectively,
after) the LTS executes a transition and enters the current location l, and t represents the time
that the system spends at the previous location. The primed variables ~v′−, ~v′+, t′ correspond to
the variables v−, v+, t at the next stage when a next transition is taken (see Figure 2.2). It then
follows that a flow constraint ~˙v ∈ [a, b] in an LHA is mapped to a linear constraint of the type,
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(~v′− − ~v+)/t′ ∈ [a, b] ∧ t′ ≥ 0 in the translated LTS. The invariant, guard, and jump conditions are
also translated accordingly as described below.
Figure 2.2: Translation from an LHA A (partial) to its discrete-state abstracted LTS SA.
Given an LHA A = (L, V,Σ, E, Init, f low, inv, guard, jump), we can construct the following
LTS SA = (L,W,Σ, E, InitS , P ), where
• W = V− ∪ V+ ∪ {t}, with V− = {v1−, . . . , vn−} and V+ = {v1+, . . . , vn+},
• let ~w = (v1−, . . . , vn−, v1+, . . . , vn+, t) and ~β be a valuation of ~w, then (l0, ~β0) ∈ InitS with
~β0 = (0, . . . , 0, 0, a01, . . . , a
0
n),
• ∀e = (l, σ, l′) ∈ E, p(e) = flow(l)|~˙v←(~v′−−~v+)/t′ ∧ inv(l)|~v←~v′− ∧ guard(e)|~v←~v′−
∧ jump(e)|~v←~v′−,~v′←~v′+ ∧ inv(l′)|~v′←~v′+ ∧ (t′ ≥ 0).
In order to handle the case of t = 0, every inequality in flow(l)|~˙v←(~v′−−~v+)/t′ is modified by
multiplying t′ at both sides.
Example 2. The LTS model SProc i = (L i,W i,Σ i, E i, InitS i, P i) derived from the LHA
model Proc i for process i in the Fischer protocol is shown in Figure 2.3, where
• L i = {I i, R i, C i, A i},
• W i = {v i−, v i+, n−, n+, t i},
• Σ i = ∅,
• InitS i = {(I i, (0, 0, 0, 0, 0))},
• E i is clear from the context of Figure 2.3,
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• P i defines the transition relation function as follows:
P i((I i, R i)) = (n′− = 0) ∧ (v i′+ = 0) ∧ (0 ≤ v i′+ ≤ D1) ∧ (t i′ ≥ 0),
P i((R i,C i)) = (v i′− − v i+ = t i′) ∧ (0 ≤ v i′− ≤ D1) ∧ (n′+ = i)
∧(v i′+ = 0) ∧ (v i+ ≥ 0) ∧ (t i′ ≥ 0),
P i((C i,A i)) = (v i′− − v i+ = t i′) ∧ (0 ≤ v i′−) ∧ (n′− = i) ∧ (v i′− ≥ D2)
∧(t i′ ≥ 0),
P i((A i, I i)) = (n′− = 0) ∧ (t i′ ≥ 0),
P i((C i, I i)) = (v i′− − v i+ = t i′) ∧ (0 ≤ v i′−) ∧ (n′+ 6= i) ∧ (v i′− ≥ D2)
∧(t i′ ≥ 0).
Figure 2.3: LTS model for process i in the Fischer protocol
For both A and SA, the discrete transition trace of r is (l
0, σ0, l1)(l1, σ1, l2) . . . (li, σi, li+1) . . . .
Location l′ is reachable in A (or SA) if there exists a run in A (or SA) with a transition trace
(l0, σ0, l1)(l1, σ1, l2) . . . (li, σi, l′). The set of transition traces associated with all finite-length runs
in A (or SA) is called the language of A (or SA) and is denoted by L(A) (or L(SA)). It is obvious
that L(A) ⊆ E∗ (or L(SA) ⊆ E∗) and L(A) (or L(SA)) is prefix closed. There exists a precise
equivalence between an LHA and its discrete-state abstracted LTS. (see Theorem 1 in [10] and its
proof):
Theorem 1. Given an LHA A as in Definition 1, an LTS SA as in Definition 2 constructed using
above procedures satisfies L(SA) = L(A).
Theorem 1 shows that A and SA have the same behaviors over the discrete locations, i.e.,
L(A) = L(SA). Therefore, the reachability problem of A can be reduced to the reachability
problem of SA.
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Remark 2. Note one can also encode the reachability of some safe set of continuous states in the
form of the reachability of a certain discrete location, by first refining the original model with respect
to the given safe set of continuous states. Suppose such a safe region is encoded as φ . Then we can
introduce a new discrete state called “unsafe”, and split each transition edge e with guard guard(e)
into a pair of transitions, one guarded by guard(e)∧φ that reaches the original successor of e, and
another guarded by guard(e) ∧ ¬φ that reaches the newly added discrete location “unsafe”.
2.3.3 Safety Verification Algorithm of LHA
Given the notations introduced above, we have the following safety verification algorithm for
an LHA under the proposed CEFSR framework.
Algorithm 1: Safety verification of LHA.
Input: LHA A and its unsafe locations.
1 SA ← Translate(A);
2 GA ← Abstract(SA);
3 specsafe ← ¬Unsafe;
4 repeat
5 ce←ModelCheck(GA,G(specsafe));
6 if ce = null then
7 Terminate(“Safe.”);
8 else if Validate(SA, ce) = > then
9 Terminate(“Unsafe.”, ce);
10 else
11 unsat-core← UnsatCore(SA, ce) ;
12 specsafe ← specsafe ∨ Encode(unsat-core) ;
13 end
14 until running time limit is reached ;
15 Terminate(“Time out.”);
In line 1, the function Translate(A) returns the discrete-behaviors equivalent LTS SA con-
structed from LHA A following the procedures described in Section 2.3.2. In line 2, the function
Translate(SA) returns the discrete transition graph of SA as its abstraction model. Line 3 ini-
tializes the safety specification with the atomic predicate “¬Unsafe”, where “Unsafe” holds at the
given unsafe locations of A. Lines 4-14 form the CEFSR loop. In line 5, G(specsafe) is the temporal
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logic formula denoting the global safety specification, where “G” denotes the “globally” operator.
The function ModelCheck(GA,G(specsafe)) performs BDD-based model checking on GA against
G(specsafe). In case of satisfaction, ModelCheck(GA,G(specsafe)) returns null, and in line 7 the
function Terminate(“Safe.”) terminates the algorithm and prints “Safe.”. Otherwise, it returns a
counterexample ce = e0 . . . en in the form of a sequence of consecutive edges of SA, where only e
n
is the edge leading to an unsafe location. ce is concrete in SA if the constraint set along its path is
satisfiable. Note that the constraints of ce also include the initial constraint PInit. The validation
of ce is reduced to the SMT problem of checking PInit∧
(∧n
i=0 P (e
i)
)
; this is performed by the func-
tion Validate(SA, ce). If Validate(SA, ce) returns true, the function Terminate(“Unsafe.”, ce)
terminates the algorithm and prints “Unsafe.”, together with the concrete counterexample ce. Oth-
erwise ce is called spurious if PInit∧
(∧n
i=0 P (e
i)
)
is unsatisfiable. The function UnsatCore(SA, ce)
in line 11 computes an unsatisfiable core (unsat-core), which is a minimal subset of constraints
whose conjunction is still unsatisfiable. By mapping the unsat-core to the edges of SA, the function
Encode(unsat-core) returns the minimal invalid fragment (MIF) of ce, denoted by fmin. Note not
all constraints of an edge need to appear in the unsat-core for that edge to be included in MIF. Also
note due to the minimality requirement, the edges that appear in MIF must be consecutive since
any non-consecutive edges have no variables in common hence cannot conflict with each other.
We relax the specification to rule out all spurious counterexamples that share an unsat-core
by encoding the unsat-core and disjuncting it with the current specification. Then in the next
iteration, the relaxed specification accepts all counterexamples that contain the minimal invalid
fragment before reaching the unsafe location. Let fmin = e
jej+1 . . . ek with 0 ≤ j ≤ k ≤ n. There
are two cases to consider. The first case is when PInit is included in the unsat-core (implying j = 0,
not vise versa). The consecutiveness property of the unsat-core implies that the MIF starts at the
initial location. So the specification must be relaxed so as to accept any path for which MIF appears
in the very beginning. On the other hand, if PInit is not in the unsat-core, then the specification
should be relaxed to accept the MIF to appear anywhere in a path, but prior to reaching an unsafe
location. Accordingly, the temporal logic encoding of the unsat-core is given by:
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Encode(unsat-core) =

∧k
i=0
(
Xi(liXli+1)
)
PInit ∈ unsat-core
(¬Unsafe)U
(∧k
i=j
(
Xi−j(liXli+1)
))
otherwise,
where “U” denotes the “until” operator, “X” denotes the “next” operator and Xi is the composition
of i number of “X”. We now establish the correctness of Algorithm 1 as follows.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 is correct.
Proof. Since GA is the abstract model of SA, L(SA) ⊆ L(GA). So if Algorithm 1 terminates
with “Safe.”, then it implies that the set of bad locations is not reachable in GA, thereby also
not reachable in SA or A. Otherwise if Algorithm 1 terminates with “Safe.”, then because of the
counterexample validation we know that the concrete counterexample ce is a valid run in SA, which
in turn implies that ce is a valid run in A following Theorem 1.
2.3.4 Concurrent LHA
Definition 3. Let A i = (L i, V i,Σ i, E i, Init i, f low i, inv i, guard i, jump i), i = 1, . . . , k,
the concurrent LHA, that is synchronously composed of A 1, . . . , A k, is given by A =‖ki=1 A i :=
(L, V,Σ, E, Init, f low, inv, guard, jump), where
• L := ×ki=1L i,
• V := ∪ki=1V i,
• Σ := ×ki=1Σ i, where Σ i = Σ i ∪ {},
• E := ×ki=1E i, where E i = E i ∪ {(l i, , l i) | l i ∈ L i},
• ((l 10, . . . , l k0),~a0) ∈ Init, iff (l i0,~a i0) ∈ Init i, where ~a i0 is ~a0’s projection on V i,
• ∀l = (l 1, . . . , l k) ∈ L, inv(l) := ∧ki=1inv i(l i),
• ∀l = (l 1, . . . , l k) ∈ L, let I(l, vj) = {i| flow i(l i)(vj) 6= null} be is the index set of
component LHA that has flow constraint on vj at l, define flow(l) := ∧vj∈V f(l, vj), where
f(l, vj) =

∧i∈I(l,vj)flow(l i)(vj) I(l, vj) 6= ∅
(v˙j = 0) I(l, vj) = ∅
,
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• ∀e ∈ E, guard(e) := ∧ki=1guard i(e i) ∧ syn(e), where syn : E → {>,⊥} is used to capture
user-specified enabling constraints. When guard(e) = ⊥, e is invalid,
• ∀e ∈ E, let J(e, vj) = {i|jump i(e i)(vj) 6= null}, where J(l, vj) is the index set of compo-
nent LHA that has jump constraint on vj at l, define jump(e) := ∧vj∈V j(e, vj), where
j(e, vj) =

∧i∈J(e,vj)jump(e i)(vj) J(e, vj) 6= ∅
(v′j = vj) J(e, vj) = ∅
.
The definition of the concurrent LHA above is a more compact version of the one in [9]. Note
in the context of a concurrent LHA, the edges within a MIF are the edges of the composed LHA,
and the unsat-core needs to be further mapped to the edges of underlying component LHAs. Each
concurrent edge ei in a fragment can be decomposed into a set of edges (e 1i, . . . , e ki), where
e ji denotes an edge from component LHA A j at the ith step. Then an unsat-core can further
map to a set of sequence of edges of the component LHAs. Accordingly the encoding of unsat-core
for a concurrent LHA, that maps down to minimal invalid fragments of individual component LHAs
is given by:
Encode(unsat-core) =

∧k
i=0
(
Xi
∧
k∈Ki(l k
iXl ki+1)
)
PInit ∈ unsat-core
(¬Unsafe)U
(∧k
i=j
(
Xi−j
∧
k∈Ki(l k
iXl ki+1)
))
otherwise,
where Ki is the index set of component LHAs that participate in the ith step of the counterexample
and contribute to the unsat-core. Note that this encoding of unsat-core matches to the encoding in
case of a single LHA presented in the previous section. The following algorithm extends Algorithm 1
from the case of a single LHA to that of a concurrent LHA:
Algorithm 2: Safety verification of concurrent LHA
Input: Components LHA A i, i = 1, . . . , k and the unsafe concurrent locations.
1 A←‖ki=1 A i ; // Construct the concurrent LHA A from Ais
2 Algorithm1(A,unsafe concurrent locations) ; // Call Algorithm 1
22
2.4 Implementation of LhaVrf
2.4.1 Architecture
The tool LhaVrf is implemented in the programming language F#. The architecture consists
of six modules, and the data flow among them occurs along the arrows, as shown in Figure 2.4.
Each of the modules is introduced separately in the following subsections.
Figure 2.4: Architecture of LhaVrf
2.4.1.1 Input Processor
The Input Processor accepts a series of txt files as its inputs. Each txt file MDL4LHA i.txt
describes a component LHA A i with the following syntax:
〈model〉 ::= 〈transition〉* 〈constraint〉* 〈var set〉 〈init loc〉〈init state〉* 〈unsafe loc〉
〈transition〉 ::= ‘$’ 〈location〉 〈edge〉 〈location〉
〈constraint〉 ::= 〈location〉 ‘:’ 〈flow〉
| 〈location〉 ‘:’ 〈invariant〉
| 〈edge〉 ‘:’ 〈guard〉
| 〈edge〉 ‘:’ 〈jump〉
〈var set〉 ::= ‘@’ 〈variable〉*
〈init loc〉 ::= ‘!’ 〈location〉
〈init state〉 ::= ‘!!’ 〈variable〉 〈number〉
〈unsafe loc〉 ::= ‘#’ 〈location〉*
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The Input Processor parses the syntactical lines in each input file and passes the data containing
the description information of the LHA to the Data Mapper (e1 in Figure 2.4).
2.4.1.2 Data Mapper
In the Data Mapper, each location or transition is assigned a unique id composed by its subsys-
tem index and its serial number in the subsystem. Each atomic predicate is mapped to its source
location or transition id. The unsafe locations are also stored here coupled with there own ids.
These mapping data is sent to Model builder (e2 in Figure 2.4) as well as Path Analyzer (e3 in
Figure 2.4) for later use.
2.4.1.3 Model Builder
The Model Builder collects all the data from the Data Mapper and computes the LTS model of
the concurrent LHA: For every possible concurrent edge, the module collects the relevant predicates
in the concurrent LHA model and converts them into the edge-predicate for the LTS model. Then,
the Model Builder calls the Path Analyzer (e4 in Figure 2.4) for validating the edge, and only when
the edge is valid, it adds the edge to the LTS model.
The Model Builder also collects the unsafe locations and encodes them into the initial LTL spec-
ification G(¬Unsafe). Then it passes the abstract model and the LTL specification in LTS2SMV.txt
to the Model Checker NuSMV (e5 in Figure 2.4).
2.4.1.4 Model Checker (NuSMV)
NuSMV is a well known symbolic model checker. Once called by the Model Builder, it checks
the abstract model in the LTS2SMV.txt file against its specification. If it is satisfied, the entire
program terminates with the output stating that the system is safe. Otherwise, a counterexample
is generated and written into SMV2LTS.txt and passed on to the Path Analyzer (e6 in Figure 2.4).
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2.4.1.5 Path Analyzer (SMT solver Z3)
The Path Analyzer accepts edge guards from the Model Builder and returns whether or not those
are satisfiable. It also accepts a counterexample returned from NuSMV, and gathers the predicates of
the counterexample edges from the Data Mapper. The SMT solver Z3 inside the module accepts the
predicate constraints, solves for satisfiability, and returns “sat” along with the valid assignments
to the variables or “unsat” along with an unsat-core (a set of constraint id). If the counterexample
from SMV2LTS.txt is found valid, the entire program terminates with the output stating that the
system is unsafe and reports the concrete counterexample and the valid assignments. Otherwise
the unsat-core is sent to the Specification Relaxer (e7 in Figure 2.4).
2.4.1.6 Specification Relaxer
Given an unsat-core received from the Path Analyzer, the Specification Relaxer relaxes the cur-
rent specification formula by disjuncting it with the encoding of the unsat-core, using the mapping
information created in the Data Mapper. The relaxed formula is then sent to the Model Builder
(edge 8 in Figure 2.4) to start a new round of iteration. Thereby the edges e5 → e6 → e7 → e8
form a verification loop.
2.4.2 An Illustrative Example
In the Fischer protocol case, assume there are two processes, and that at most one process can
make a location transition at any given time under interleaving semantics [9, 49]. The LhaVrf first
reads the model files then automatically translates each input file into its LHA model Proc i and
stores it in the Data Mapper. Next, all the LHA Proc i are composed to form the concurrent
LHA Proc, and converted to the LTS SProc, from which the abstract model as shown in Figure 2.5
(with unsafe location in shadow) is extracted.
For the specification, Proc 1 and Proc 2 are not allowed to be in the access state at the
same time. More precisely, we have the following LTL specification: G(¬Unsafe), where Unsafe=
A 1 ∧A 2, representing that both Proc 1 and Proc 2 are in the access state at the same time.
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Figure 2.5: The abstract model for the two-process Fischer protocol
Note in the Fischer protocol case, there exists at most one edge between any pair of loca-
tions, and so any edge can be identified by a unique pair of locations. Therefore, we can ex-
press each counterexample/fragment as a sequence of locations for simplicity. When the param-
eters D1 = 4, D2 = 3, NuSMV generates a counterexample ce = (I 1, I 2)(R 1, I 2)(R 1, R 2)
(R 1, C 2)(R 1, A 2)(C 1, A 2)(A 1, A 2). The set of predicate constraints, that are mapped
to the locations and edges along the counterexample path, is sent to Z3. In this case, Z3 re-
turns “sat” and a valid solution, which means when D1 = 4, D2 = 3, the mutual exclusion is
not guaranteed. On the other hand, when D1 = 2, D2 = 3, NuSMV generates a counterexam-
ple ce = (I 1, I 2)(R 1, I 2)(C 1, I 2)(C 1, R 2) (C 1, C 2)(C 1, A 2)(A 1, A 2). Upon
SMT solving the mapped predicate constraint set, Z3 returns “unsat” and an unsat-core that con-
tains three atomic constraints (n2v = 1), (n
3
u = 0) and (n
3
u = n
2
v), where a superscript denotes
the step number of the transition in the counterexample. The three constraints are mapped to
jump 1((R 1, C 1)), guard 2((I 2, R 2)) and guard 2((I 2, R 2)) respectively as shown be-
low in bold:
Proc 1 :
Proc 2 :
I 1
I 2

R 1
I 2

C 1
I 2

C 1
R 2

C 1
C 2

C 1
A 2

A 1
A 2
 .
Since the unsat-core doesn’t include the initial condition constraint, its encoding is :
Encode(unsat-core) = (¬Unsafe)U((R 1XC 1)X(I 2XR 2)).
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Accordingly, the relaxed specification formula for model checking in the next iteration is the dis-
junction of the current specification and the above encoding of the unsat-core:
(
G(¬Unsafe))∣∣∣((¬Unsafe)U((R 1XC 1)X(I 2XR 2))),
where “|” denotes the disjunction. The verifier repeats the execution loop as above for twelve
iterations, finally showing that the unsafe state is not reachable. In the case of the 10-process
Fischer mutual exclusion protocol, this corresponds to a space of 410 = ∼1Million locations, and
potentially 10× 5× 49 = ∼13Million edges (due to the user-specified enabling constraints), given
an unsafe state Unsafe= A 1∧A 2, the verifier also proves that the unsafe state is not reachable,
and with almost the same running time as the 2-process case. By symmetry it follows that no other
unsafe state (of the for, A i∧A j, i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 10}, i 6= j, is reachable. One of the counterexamples
is as follows, where as above the unsat-core is shown in bold:
Proc 1 :
Proc 2 :
Proc 3 :
· · · :
Proc 10 :

I 1
I 2
I 3
. . .
I 10


R 1
I 2
I 3
. . .
I 10


C 1
I 2
I 3
. . .
I 10


C 1
R 2
I 3
. . .
I 10


C 1
C 2
I 3
. . .
I 10


C 1
A 2
I 3
. . .
I 10


A 1
A 2
I 3
. . .
I 10

.
The unsat-core and its encoding are identical to the 2-process case. This shows that the algorithm
has extremely good scalability due to the compactness of the unsat-core and its encoding even for
a large state space system.
The constraints in the unsat-core shown above are all on the variable n at different steps, and
the same holds for most of the other counterexamples we obtained. By observation, we know that
n is a discrete finite valued variable with its value updated only on transitions. Thus, instead of
treating n as a flow variable, we can treat it as a discrete state, with a finite set of locations ranging
over the values n can take, with its transitions guarded by events that represent the discrete location
transitions in the concurrent process model that update n. Such a model of n for the k-component
case is shown in Figure 2.6, in which n varies among k + 1 discrete integer values 0, 1, . . . , k.
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Figure 2.6: Transition system for n
An event set σ(n, n′) (with n, n′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}) associated with an edge in this model can be
derived from the original process model by looking at which discrete transition may cause the value
change of n to n′. An example is the change from 0 to 1 that occurs if and only if when F 1
changes its discrete location from R 1 to C 1. Therefore when k = 2, σ(0, 1) contains 4 valid
events as follows:{(R 1
I 2

C 1
I 2
),(
R 1
R 2

C 1
R 2
),(
R 1
C 2

C 1
C 2
),(
R 1
A 2

C 1
A 2
)}.
Once the discrete transition model for n is created, the predicates over n can be discarded
from each LHA model F i, resulting in simpler LHA models F˜ i. The concurrent model then
is obtained by composing F˜ i, i = 1, . . . , k, and the transition model for n. Figure 2.7 shows
the corresponding abstract model for the two-process case. A counterexample generated from this
new model is given in [9] as: (I 1, I 2, 0) (I 1, R 2, 0)(R 1, R 2, 0)(R 1, C 2, 2)(R 1, A 2, 2)
(C 1, A 2, 1)(A 1, A 2, 1).
Figure 2.7: The new abstract model for Fischer protocol with two processes
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Since n is no longer a flow variable, all the counterexamples related to n are eliminated. This
reduces the number of iterations dramatically, and the length of the relaxed LTL specification
reduces as a consequence. As a trade-off, the size of the abstract model gets larger (compare
Figure 2.7 versus Figure 2.5). Never the less, since NuSMV has a proven scalability, the overall
time-efficiency of the algorithm is enhanced.
So we can say that in general, if a concurrent linear hybrid system contains a variable that
has finite domain, so it gets updated only along transitions (and not within the locations), then
we can model the behavior of the variable as another transition system, and compose it with the
other subsystems (with the constraints related to the variable suppressed). This corresponds to an
“in-built” refinement of the model that automatically removes many of the invalid counterexample
paths of the original model, and expedites the verification process.
2.4.2.1 Additional Benchmark Experiments
The illustrative example of Fischer protocol illustrated above can be generalized to be modeled
as a timed automaton (TFischer and TFischer 10 in Table 2.1) and were analyzed using our tool.
Additional experimental results on other benchmark examples were also analyzed and reported
here; these were taken from Passel tool website (https://publish.illinois.edu/passel-tool/), including
rectangular Fischers protocol (RFischer), the core component of the Small Aircraft Transportation
System (SATS) landing protocol, and a purely discrete example (TMUX). All the experiments were
performed on a laptop computer with 8G memory and Intel Core @2.30GHz processor. Table 2.1
summarizes performance of the prototype tool LhaVrf on these benchmarks.
Table 2.1: Table of Performance on benchmarks.
Benchmark Safety property Number of iteration. Runtime(sec)
TFishcer 3 12 4.85
TFischer 10 3 12 5.12
RFischer 3 12 5.01
RFischer (Buggy) 7 2 2.15
SATS 3 10 4.99
TMUX 3 6 3.17
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CHAPTER 3. SIMULATION BASED VERIFICATION OF
BOUNDED-HORIZON SAFETY FOR HYBRID SYSTEM USING
DYNAMIC NUMBER OF SIMULATIONS
3.1 Introduction
Testing and simulation techniques are often used for run-time monitoring of safety-critical sys-
tems such as air-traffic management system, aircraft and automobile control. Such systems are
hybrid, possessing discrete states (also called locations), where different physical laws govern the
evolution of the continuous states, while a set of predicates guard the transitions of the discrete
states and constrain the reset values of the continuous states. However, testing and simulation are
not comprehensive to fully discover system flaws. Alternatively, formal verification methods can be
employed. As decribed in Chapter 2, a common design-time safety verification involves computing
the reachable set over-approximation symbolically, and checking whether the over-approximation
does not reach the unsafe region [9, 10, 12, 19, 20, 27, 36, 50]. In contrast, the alternative simulation-
based verification approach, that can be applied in run-time, generates a finite set of simulation
traces from current system states, then computes over-approximation sets around those simulation
trajectories to cover for the infinite set of cases that were not simulated [51, 52, 53, 54, 55]. The
computation of the over-approximation sets relies on certain continuity properties.
The reachable set is usually non-convex and hard to compute precisely, and so those are typically
over-approximated using certain easy-to-compute representations. Examples are support function in
SpaceEx [27], Taylor model in Flow* [36], polyhedra/balls in C2E2 [53, 54, 55], and zonotope in CORA
[56, 57]. In SpaceEx and Flow*, the reachable set over-approximation of a set S over each time-step
is performed directly on S using symbolic representation and one-step evolution’s approximated
post-image formulas, and implemented through support function or Taylor Model. This introduces
additional errors when computing discrete post-images, due to a lack of compatibility between the
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reachable state representation in continuous stage vs. guard/reset representation used for discrete
transition (e.g. a hyperplane). This calls for representation conversion, which requires adoption
of additional over-approximation, when connecting two consecutive stages of continuous evolution.
Tools that require representation conversion usually do not perform well on models with frequent
discrete jumps.
In contrast, in a bounded horizon verification from simulation approach, the correctness is
established from multiple simulation runs of the system, and over-approximating tubes around
those, whose initial face covers the entire initial set. Over time, the scope of study has expanded
from continuous linear dynamics [51, 52] to those described by a richer class of hybrid nonlinear ones
[53, 54, 55]. In [53], authors presented a framework that formally verifies the bounded time safety
of a subclass of hybrid nonlinear systems, the so called switched systems. A switched system has
time-triggered mode changes, determined by pre-specified switching signals indicating the switching
times and destination locations. In contrast, a general hybrid system changes its discrete mode
autonomously as determined from the guard predicates over states, and the sequence of discrete
mode switches are not known a priori. A contribution in our work is to develop the simulation-based
verification approach for this general class of hybrid dynamics.
In prior works, a simulation of entire time horizon is used as a reference or representative for
a class of system behaviors starting close to the reference. Discrepancy functions [58, 59] are used
to bound the state deviation from neighboring non-reference states. In [53], the use of discrepancy
function requires users to provide control theoretic annotations on the dynamics. Moreover, the
algorithms in [53] are based upon two assumptions on the hybrid systems, namely, (i) state resets
are not allowed, and (ii) the executions starting from the same class of initial states/inputs must
all experience the same discrete behaviors [54, 55]. Both assumptions are restrictive, e.g., the first
assumption does not hold for a simple bouncing ball. On the other hand, for a general hybrid
system, a simulation error may cause a deviation in the result of discrete-jump, violating the
second assumption above. Once a location deviation occurs, the original simulation is no longer
a reliable estimate, meaning that a simulation of the entire time horizon may not always qualify
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as a reliable reference. In addition, determining a finite set of representative initial states, that
represent executions that visit the same sequence of discrete locations within a given time horizon,
is not yet proven to be computable. Here, we proposed a simulation-based verification algorithm
for bounded-time safety that can deal with general nonlinear hybrid systems, while relaxing the
aforementioned assumptions, and also bypassing the computability issue of the representative set
of initial states, by way of their dynamic, on-the-fly, and as-needed computation.
A key concept in the simulation-based approaches is the discrepancy function that is used for
bounding the deviation between two neighboring trajectories as a function of their initial distance
and time. [53] has shown that some proof certificates routinely used in stability analysis of dynam-
ical systems are in fact discrepancy functions. For example, Lipschitz property of a flow function
lends an exponentially growing bound among the system trajectories. On the other hand, incre-
mental stability of a system specifies that the distance between two trajectories remains bounded by
a KL function of their initial distance and time. An even stronger property exists for system with
a contraction metric, whose trajectories converge exponentially with time. In [60], under the as-
sumptions ensuring incremental stability of a switched system, it is possible to construct a symbolic
model that is approximately bisimilar to the original switched system with a precision that can be
chosen a priori. Algorithmic controller syndissertation then can be applied on the symbolic model,
which is supposedly easier to handle than the original model. In the simulation-based reachability
verification, discrepancy functions based on the KL function, are shown to be able to diminish the
over-approximation error bound [53]. However, simply assuming the incremental stability is not
enough, one has to actually obtain a KL discrepancy function prior to a computation based on it.
As [53] pointed out, obtaining such a bounded relationship among trajectories is computationally
intractable in general. Aside from using better discrepancy functions, several other heuristic tech-
niques such as using localized exponential discrepancy functions during each time interval, have
been adopted by C2E2 to slow down the error growth [23, 24, 38]. In this chapter, we have developed
a practical approach that bypasses the intractable pre-verification analysis of finding a KL func-
tion if it exists, uses the easily computable Lipschitz constant based discrepancy function, yet also
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alleviates the fast growth of over-approximation errors for stable systems. Lipschitz constants can
be computed algorithmically for linear, polynomial, and certain classes of trigonometric functions.
For more general classes, empirical techniques can estimate it over closed subsets [61].
Briefly, in our approach, the bounded initial set is covered by a partition whose cells are γ-
hypercubes (so distance from center of hypercube to a side is γ, and where γ is a user-defined
partition size parameter). The center of a hypercube is chosen as its representative state. Each
such representative state is forward simulated in discrete time-steps of user chosen intervals, and
the corresponding error is tracked using a bound. After a finite number of time-steps (which is
another user-defined parameter), the states reached at the current final time are covered by a new
partition with cells that are again γ-hypercubes. Also, when a discrete jump occurs, the newly
reached states after the jump are again covered by a partition with γ-hypercubes cells. Upon each
such partition, the process of selecting the representative states, one per cell, and their forward
simulations, continues, until the required time for forward simulation bound is elapsed. We refer
to this type of on-the-fly partitioning as “dynamic partitioning”. In this way, the exponential
error growth among trajectories remains confined to short time-intervals, as opposed to the entire
simulation horizon. As a result, the over-approximation bounds evolve at a much less growth
rate (or even at a decaying rate for the case of converging trajectories). We have proven that,
for incremental (input-to-state) stable dynamics, the two growth trends culminate into a bounded
deviation, which can be made arbitrarily small with the choice of simulation/partition parameters.
This boundedness of the trajectory deviation estimation using only a Lipschitz constant based
discrepancy function, is a novel feature of our approach. This makes our approach practical since a
Lipschitz-based discrepancy function is easily computable, while a more precise discrepancy function
may not be available since there is no known algorithm to compute it in general. (Certainly if a
more precise discrepancy function is available, our algorithm can also utilize it.) Our contributions
are summarized as follows:
• Our dynamic partitioning approach supports state-triggered discrete jumps with guard/reset
conditions. Errors in simulation can alter discrete behaviors rendering a simulation-trace
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obsolete, when state-triggered discrete transitions are allowed. Our approach circumvents
this problem by introducing new simulations as needed, and on-the-fly.
• Our dynamic partitioning scheme controls the error growth of over-approximation, so that
even for a Lipschitz constant based discrepancy function, it guarantees that the error converges
to a constant bound for incremental stable systems.
• This guarantees that the number of representative simulations also converge for an incremental
stable system, and in fact may become smaller in number as forward simulations are carried
out.
• Our approach relies on discrepancy function based on Lipschitz constant, that is easy to
compute in practice, without sacrificing accuracy due to our use of dynamic partitioning.
More precise discrepancy function are not practically computable – their computation may
even be undecidable. But those can be used in our approach if available.
• Our approach allows piecewise constant bounded inputs.
• Our approach only partitions the “reachability boundary” that reduces the number of repre-
sentative simulations while maintaining verification correctness.
• We have implemented a prototype verifier HS3V incorporating our innovations, and have tested
an compared it on a variety of benchmarks.
This chapter extends the conference version [39] in multiple ways. Firstly, a new section on
error growth control is added, explaining the dynamic partitioning scheme, providing a correctness
theorem and its corollaries regarding the boundedness of trajectory deviation errors, and discussing
its novelty and benefits. Secondly, we updated the tool HS3V implementing the above new ideas.
Lastly, more experimental results are presented to show the improvement of the error growth control
for both continuous and hybrid dynamic evolution.
Rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Notations and preliminaries are given in Section 3.2.
The stepwise computation of the reachable set over-approximation regarding continuous evolution
is described in Section 3.3. The dynamic partitioning scheme for error growth control is given in
Section 3.4. The complete algorithm is in Section 3.5. The implementation of our prototype tool
and experimental results for several benchmarks are given in Section 3.6.
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3.2 Notation and Preliminary
For a vector ~v ∈ Rn, the notation ‖~v‖ denotes its `∞ norm. The diameter of a bounded set S
of a metric space is denoted as D(S) = sup{‖~v − ~v′‖|~v,~v′ ∈ S}. Bγ(~v) = {~v′|‖~v′ − ~v‖ ≤ γ} denotes
the γ-hypercube centered at ~v. The Minkowski sum of two sets S and S′ in a vector space is defined
as S ⊕ S′ = {~v + ~v′|~v ∈ S1, ~v′ ∈ S′}. A continuous function f : [0, a) 7→ R≥0 is a class K function
if it is strictly increasing and f(0) = 0. It is said to belong to class K∞ if it is defined on R≥0 and
f(s) goes to∞ as s goes to∞. A function f : [0, a)×R≥0 7→ R≥0 is a class KL function if, for each
fixed t, the function f(·, t) belongs to class K; for each fixed s, the function f(s, t) is decreasing and
approaches to 0 as t goes to ∞. A function f : Rn 7→ R is Lipschitz if there exists a constant c > 0
such that ‖f(x) − f(x′)‖ ≤ c‖x − x′‖ for all x, x′ in the domain of f . A matrix is called Hurwitz
when all its eigenvalues have non-negative real parts.
In this chapter, we analyze a class of deterministic hybrid automata in which the continuous
dynamics have piecewise constant bounded inputs. The following definition is a simplified version
of the standard definition of input-output hybrid automaton (I/O HA) from [11]; the invariant,
guard, and reset conditions only depend on states.
Definition 4. A hybrid automaton with inputs is a tuple A = (L, V,E, V0, U, flow, inv, guard, reset),
where:
• Discrete state: L is a finite set of discrete locations.
• Continuous state: V = {v(1), v(2), . . . , v(n)} is a finite set of real-valued state variables.
~v = [v(1), v(2), . . . , v(n)] is their vector representation.
• Discrete jumps: E ⊆ L× L is the set of discrete jumps.
• Initial state set: V0 ⊂ Rn is the nonempty bounded initial state set (initial set for short).
• Continuous Input: U = {u(1), u(2), . . . , u(m)} is a finite set of real-valued input variables.
Let ~u(i)(t) : R≥0 7→ R be a piecewise continuous bounded function of t, that describes the
value of u(i) changing over time. ~u = [u(1), u(2), . . . , u(m)] is the vector representation of input
variables and ~u(t) is defined analogously.
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• Flow: The flow function flow assigns each location l ∈ L a differential equation flow(l) :
~˙v = fl(~v, ~u) where fl : R
n×Rm 7→ Rn constrains the rates at which the variables change w.r.t.
time.
• Invariant: The invariant function inv assigns each location l ∈ L a predicate inv(l) ⊆ Rn
over the domain of ~v that constrains the values of the variables within the location l.
• Guard: The guard function guard assigns each discrete jump e = (l, l′) ∈ E a predicate
guard(e) over the domain of ~v such that the jump e is enabled at a state ~v ∈ inv(l) if and
only if ~v ∈ guard(e).
• Reset: The reset function reset assigns each discrete jump e = (l, l′) ∈ E a function resete
over the domain of ~v such that the jump e enabled at state ~v ∈ inv(l) is accompanied with a
value reset: ~v′ = resete(~v) ∈ inv(l′). Define resete(S) = {~v′|∃~v ∈ S,~v′ = resete(~v)}.
In our study, we make the following assumptions:
• Piecewise constant bounded input: We assume that the input u(t) for each initial state
is a piecewise constant function, where the discrete changes occur only at the simulation
sample times. In other words, ∀t ≥ 0, ~u(t) ∈ Bru(~u0˜(t)), with ~u0˜(t) is a piecewise constant
function representing nominal input and ru ∈ R≥0.
• Linear guard predicate: The guard predicates are linear, each representing a hyperplane
in Rn. This assumption is mainly for the ease of computation of the intersection between the
polyhedral representation of the reachable set and the guards. The guard predicates can be
taken to be more general semi-algebraic sets, if performing the set operations based on the
the cylindrical algebraic decomposition [62].
• Affine reset function: The reset functions are affine. This again is more of computational
simplicity, as affine maps preserve polyhedral sets.
• Lipschitz continuity: For each l ∈ L, the flow function fl is Lipschitz in ~v and ~u with
Lipschitz constant cl.
• Simulation time-step can be chosen smaller than dwell-time: By dwell-time, we refer
to the time spent while evolving within a single location. We assume the system possesses a
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minimum dwell-time ∆ > 0 over the duration of simulation horizon, so that we can pick a
simulation time-step δ < ∆ to avoid multiple discrete jumps in a single time-step.
Given a hybrid automaton A as defined in Definition 4 satisfying the above assumptions, we
have the following definitions regarding its behavior and simulation.
Definition 5. A trajectory of A, denoted by τ , is a bounded-time continuous evolution of the state
inside a discrete location. Specifically, τ is a function, τ : [0, T ] 7→ inv(l), where T ∈ R>0 and l ∈ L.
We denote the trajectory from state ~v0 ∈ inv(l) with input signal ~u0(t) as τ~v0,~u0(t). τ~v0,~u0(t)(t) is
the solution of the flow differential equation ~˙v = fl(~v, ~u), with fl : R
n × Rm 7→ Rn, initial state ~v0
and input signal ~u0(t). The Lipschitz continuity assumption ensures the existence and uniqueness
of the trajectory for all initial states and inputs.
Definition 6. A simulation trajectory of A, is a sequence of state-time pairs, obtained by simulation
using numerical algorithms, that estimates the continuous variables at discrete time instances. For
a location l ∈ L, initial state ~v0 ∈ inv(l), input signal ~u0(t), sample time-step δ > 0, single time-
step simulation error  > 0 and time bound T , a (~v0, ~u0(t), δ, , T )-simulation trajectory is a finite
sequence (~v0, 0)(~v1, δ) . . . (~vk, kδ), where k = dT/δe, and
• ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, ~vi ∈ inv(l).
• ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, ‖~vi − τ~vi−1,~u0(t+(i−1)δ)(δ)‖ ≤ .
Definition 7. An execution of A, denoted by α, is a finite sequence of trajectories concatenated
via discrete jumps. A finite sequence τ0e1τ1 . . . ekτk is an execution of A if it satisfies the following
• Initial condition τ0(0) ∈ V0.
• ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, τi : [0, Ti] 7→ inv(li), is a trajectory.
• ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, ei = (li−1, li) ∈ E, τi−1(Ti−1) ∈ guard(ei).
• ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, τi(0) = resetei(τi−1(Ti−1))
A state ~v∗ ∈ Rn is reachable in bounded time T , if and only if there exist an execution α =
τ0e1τ1 . . . ekτk such that τk(Tk) = ~v∗ and Σki=0Ti ≤ T .
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3.3 Reachable Tube Computation
3.3.1 Error Growth in Continuous Evolution
A tube constructed around a trajectory τ according to the discrepancy function of the location
dynamics contains all the trajectories starting in a neighborhood of τ(0), and in which case τ
is referred to as a reference trajectory. In a simulation-based bounded-horizon safety verification
approach, we can use the simulation trajectory starting from τ(0) to approximate the reference
trajectory τ , by accounting for the simulation error bound.
Consider a reference trajectory τ~v0,~u0(t) over [0, T ] in l and a neighboring trajectory τ~v′0,~u′0(t) also
in l, where ‖~v′0 − ~v0‖ ≤ rv and ‖~u′0(t) − ~u0(t)‖ ≤ ru for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Let (~v0, 0) . . . (~vk, kδ) be
the (~v0, ~u0(t), δ, , T )-simulation trajectory, and {γli = ‖τ~v′0,~u′0(t)(iδ)− ~vk‖}ki=0 denote the collection
of the `∞ distances between τ~v′0,~u′0(t) (the actual trajectory) versus the simulation trajectory at
the sample times. By definition, τ~v0,~u0(t), τ~v′0,~u′0(t) and the simulation trajectory follow the same
continuous dynamics flow(l). Then we have the following proposition [39], which can be derived
from Lemma 1 in [54] but with extension to also include the inputs. For an unforced system (i.e.,
with zero input), Proposition 1 reduces to Lemma 1 in [54].
Proposition 1. Consider the notation in the paragraph above. Then,
γl0 = ‖~v′0 − ~v0‖ ≤ rv, and ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , i}, γli ≤ γli−1eclδ + ruδ(eclδ − 1) + ,
where cl is the Lipschitz constant for flow(l), δ is the simulation time-step, and  is the single
time-step simulation error.
The sequence {γli}ki=0 is restricted by the recursive inequalities given in Proposition 1. The
unique sequence that satisfies the equality at each recursion gives the most precise upper bounds of
the distances between τ~v′0,~u′0(t) and the (~v0, ~u0(t), δ, , T )-simulation trajectory at the sample times.
This unique sequence, denoted by {γl
i
}ki=0, is useful since for most nonlinear dynamics, an analytical
solution is not available. Figure 3.1(a) shows a fragment of τ~v′0,~u′0(t) marked by the blue curve and
a (~v0, ~u0(t), δ, , T )-simulation trajectory with its simulation values marked by the green dots. The
error at the ith simulation time-step is bounded by γl
i
.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.1: (a) A two time-step fragment of τ~v′0,~u′0(t) and (~v0, ~u0(t), δ, , T )-simulation trajectory,
{γl
i
}ki=0 are computed by Proposition 1. (b) The first two time-steps of solving the equation
x˙ = t − 1/(1 + x) with x(0)=1 and δ = 0.5 numerically. The dashed curve shows the trajectory,
the dots show the simulation values, while the solid curves show the parabolas that are used to
compute the simulation. Figure 3.1(b) is taken from [63].
In the context of hybrid dynamics that allows state-triggered discrete jumps, it is not always
possible to treat a sequence of state-time pairs obtained by a simulation engine as a reliable simu-
lation trajectory. A simulation error may cause a discrete evolution to deviate, making the forward
simulation unreliable. For this reason, we cannot use simulations over the entire time horizon to es-
timate the hybrid executions. To ensure that every simulation state-time pair is a reliable estimate
of the actual behavior, the simulation is examined at the end of each time-step, to check whether
the accumulated simulation error can cause a discrete location deviation. For this, we examine
each error bound to see if any discrete jump can be triggered at the end of any time-step. The
handling of the possible discrete jumps is described in Section 3.5, and integrated into the overall
reachability over-approximation algorithm.
3.3.2 Reachable Set in a Single Time-Step
Consider the group of trajectories with initial discrete location l ∈ L, initial states in Brv(~v0),
and input signals in Bru(~u0(t)) over [0, T ]. We construct a tube that contains all this group of
trajectories around the (~v0, ~u0(t), δ, , T )-simulation trajectory, (~v0, 0) . . . (~vk, kδ), where recall that
k = dT/δe by Definition 6. The tube segments are computed for each time-step using Algorithm 3,
which extends the one in [54] to also allow inputs.
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Algorithm 3: Building tube segment during [iδ, (i+ 1)δ].
Input: A, l, ~v0, ~u0(t), ru, δ, γ
l
i
, b ∈ R>1.
1 ~vi ← simu(~v0, ~u0(t), i), σ ← γli;
2 do
3 σ ← b · σ;
4 d = sup~v∈Bσ(~vi),~u∈Bru (~u0(iδ))‖fl(~v, ~u)‖;
5 while σ − dδ < γl
i
;
6 f = sup~v∈Bσ(~vi),~u∈Bru (~u0(iδ)) fl(~v, ~u);
7 f = inf~v∈Bσ(~vi),~u∈Bru (~u0(iδ)) fl(~v, ~u);
8 Rl[i,i+1](~v0, ~u0(t)) = Bγli
(~vi)⊕ {t · f |t ∈ [0, δ], f ∈ [f, f ]};
Output: Rl[i,i+1](~v0, ~u0(t))
Input to Algorithm 3 includes a system model A, a particular location l where the continuous
evolution occurs, simulation starting point ~v0, input signal ~u0(t), input range parameter ru, simu-
lation time-step δ, the error bound γl
i
computed using Propositional 1, and a constant gain factor
b > 1. In line 1, simu(~v0, ~u0(t), i) returns the simulation value ~vi at time iδ with initial value ~v0
and input signal ~u0(t); σ is a constant that defines the σ-hypercube Bσ(~vi) (in Figure 3.2 it is the
area marked by the dashed square) a conservative over-approximation of the one-step reachability
of Bγl
i
(~vi) (in Figure 3.2 it is the area marked by the solid square centered at ~vi).
Figure 3.2: A 2-dimensional tube segment over the time-step [iδ, (i + 1)δ] (marked by the red
shadowed area). Bγl
i
(~vi) is the over-approximation of the reachable set at time instant iδ. Note
{γl
i
}ki=0 only bound the trajectory deviations at the sample times, and so the convex hull of Bγl
i
(~vi)
and Bγl
i+1
(~vi+1) doesn’t necessarily over-approximate the reachable set in between iδ and (i+ 1)δ
due to the nonlinearity of the continuous dynamics. Hence the red shadowed area can be larger
than the said convex hull.
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The final choice of σ is obtained by repeatedly scaling itself by b starting with the initial value
γl
i
until the criteria in line 5 of Algorithm 3 is satisfied. The value of b is chosen by considering a
trade-off between the precision versus the number of iterations. In practice, b is set between 1.1 and
2.5, and the default value is set to 2 in our implementation. [54] has proved that cl ·δ < 1, then this
loop will indeed terminate. In lines 6-7, the element-wise maximum and minimum changing rates
of ~v in Bσ(~vi), denoted by f and f respectively, are computed by solving an optimization problem
over fl. In line 4, d is computed analogously. Line 8 defines the tube segment as R
l
[i,i+1](~v0, ~u0(t)),
which is the Minkowski sum of Bγl
i
(~vi) and its evolution in one time-step. The correctness of
Algorithm 3 immediately follows the correctness of Proposition 1 (proved in [39]) and Algorithm 1
in [54]. (For the case of a discrete jump within a time-step, visit Section 3.5 below.)
3.4 Error Growth Control
From Proposition 1, the error bound based on the Lipschitz constant can be seen to grow
exponentially. In this section, we introduce a dynamic partitioning scheme to alleviate the error
growth problem, without having to introduce a discrepancy function that is more precise than the
one based on Lipschitz constant. Note the motivation for doing so was discussed in introduction,
namely, that only the latter is tractably computable. We also show that for an incremental (input-
to-state) stable system, our approach provides a constant error bound in the limit, even though
we continue to utilize Lipschitz continuity based error bound that is practically computable (in
contrast to a more precise bound, based for example an incremental stability property, that may
not even be available; our approach can certainly also use the precise bound when available).
Consider a location l ∈ L of a hybrid automaton A with the flow dynamics
~˙v = fl(~v, ~u), (3.1)
with fl Lipschitz in ~v ∈ Rn and ~u ∈ Rm. Assuming no discrete jump, we propose Algorithm 4
to compute the reachable set over-approximation under continuous evolution within l starting
within the rv-hypercube Brv(~v0), under input signal ~u(t) ∈ Bru(~u0(t)), and over time bound T .
We assume here for simplicity of illustration that there is no discrete evolution; the more general
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case is discussed in the next section. Algorithm 4 periodically repartitions the states reached at
the end of a certain number of user-selected time-steps, still using the rv-hypercube cells. This
repartitioning “interrupts” the exponential growth of trajectory error bound of Proposition 1, and
in fact leads to a bounded error in case of incremental (input-to-output) stable systems.
Algorithm 4: Multiple time-steps computation of the reachable set in location l starting
from a single hypercube in bounded time with dynamic partitioning.
Input: A, l, ~v0, ~u0(t), rv, ru, {γj}mj=0, δ, T,m ∈ R>0.
1 Rl ← Brv(~v0), C l ← {~v0};
2 for i = 0; i < dT/δe; i+ + do
3 Rl ← Rl ∪⋃~v∈Cl Rl[i,i+1](~v, ~u0(t));
4 if (i > 0) ∧ (i%m = 0) then
5 C l ←Partition(⋃~v∈Cl Bγl
m
(~vm), rv)
6 end
7 end
Output: Rl
Theorem 3. Algorithm 4 is sound: ∀~v ∈ Brv(~v0), ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ∀~u(t) ∈ Bru(~u0(t)), τ~v,~u(t)(t) ∈ Rl.
Proof. In Algorithm 4, for k = 0, 1, . . . , bT/(mδ)c, C l is unchanged in between kmδ and (k+ 1)mδ,
and let it be denoted by C lk. From Propositional 1,
⋃
~v∈Clk Bγlm(~vm) over-approximates the set
of states reached from
⋃
~v∈Clk Brv(~v) at the final time mδ of m time-steps, i.e., ∀~v ∈ Brv(~v0),
∀~u(t) ∈ Bru(~u0(t)), ∀k ∈ [0, bT/(mδ)c − 1]:
τ~v,~u(t)(kmδ) ∈
⋃
~v∈Clk
Brv(~v) =⇒ τ~v,~u(t)((k + 1)mδ) ∈
⋃
~v∈Clk
Bγl
m
(~vm) ⊆
⋃
~v∈Ck+1
Brv(~v).
This is equivalent to saying that, τ~v,~u(t)(kmδ) is covered by C
l
k for any k ∈ [0, bT/(mδ)c]. Conse-
quently, there exists a tube segment within [kmδ, (k + 1)mδ] that contains τ~v,~u(t)(t).
Rl is the union of all tube segments in [0, dT/δe · δ]. Thus, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], τ~v,~u(t)(t) ∈ Rl.
For k ∈ [1, bT/(mδ)c], let Rlkm =
⋃
~v∈Clk−1 Bγlm(~vm) be the reachable set over-approximation
at time-step km. Accordingly, let ek = D(R
l
km) be the diameter of R
l
km. Figure 3.3 depicts
the error growth over the first 2m time-steps. Algorithm 4 attains notably good results for the
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bounds {ek}bT/(mδ)ck=1 compared to what would be obtained by simply Algorithm 3, without the
repartitioning introduced in Algorithm 4.
Figure 3.3: Error growth from an rv-hypercube. Trajectory deviation bound between partitions
grows exponentially, while distance among tubes (measured by the distance among simulation
values at the sample times, such as d2 in this figure) grows slower or even diminishes.
3.4.1 Effect of Stability Property on Error Growth
A nice feature of Algorithm 4 is that when the underlying dynamics converges over time, so does
the error bound of over-approximation computed by the algorithm. We first introduce a notion of
converging dynamics.
Definition 8. Dynamics (3.1) is incremental input-to-state stable (δ-ISS for short) [64] if there
exist a KL function β and a function γ ∈ K∞ such that for any t ≥ 0, any ~v,~v′ ∈ Rn, and any pair
of bounded input signals ~u(t), ~u′(t), the following holds:
‖τ~v,~u(t)(t)− τ~v′,~u′(t)(t)‖ ≤ β(‖~v − ~v′‖, t) + γ( sup
0≤ξ≤t
‖~u(ξ)− ~u′(ξ)‖).
The KL function β(‖~v−~v′‖, t) is decreasing and goes to 0 as t goes to∞, whereas the bounded
input difference gives rise to a bounded trajectory deviation.
In Algorithm 4, partitions are updated at every m time-steps, and ek = D(R
l
km) is the diameter
of the reachable set over-approximation at time-step km. We establish the following Theorem:
Theorem 4. For flow(l) that is δ-ISS, ∃c ∈ Z+ such that ∀m ≥ c, the over-approximation error
sequence {ek}bT/(mδ)ck=1 has a constant bound under Algorithm 4.
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Proof. During the first m time-steps, the initial tube grows exponentially per Proposition 1. Hence,
we have e1 = 2γ
l
m
. When k ≥ 1, at time-step km, the set of representative states of Rlkm is used
as the simulation starting point set C lk. Since γ
l
m
> γl
0
= rv, we know D(R
l
km) > rv. Hence the
representative set of Rlkm (equivalently, C
l
k) contains at least two elements. Suppose τa, τb are two
reference trajectories within [kmδ, (k + 1)mδ] starting from ~va0, ~vb0 ∈ C lk. Due to partitioning,
max
~va,~vb∈Clk
(‖~va − ~vb‖) ≤ ek.
By Definition 8, for some β ∈ KL and γ ∈ K∞,
‖τa(mδ)− τb(mδ)‖ ≤ β(‖~va − ~vb‖,mδ) + γ(ru).
Let dk+1 denote the maximum `
∞ distance between any two simulation values at time (k + 1)mδ
before partition (see for example d2 in Figure 3.3). Due to the simulation error, there exists deviation
between a reference trajectory and the corresponding simulation trajectory. Let γl

denote the bound
on their deviation at time-step m. Since the two start at the same state, γl

can be computed by
Proposition 1, using a base value 0 and m recursive equalities. Combining all factors, we have:
dk+1 ≤ β(ek,mδ) + γ(ru) + 2γl.
Since β is decreasing and goes to 0 as t goes to ∞, we can pick some constant q ∈ (0, 1), ∃c ∈ Z+
such that ∀m ≥ c, β(ek,mδ) ≤ qek. Then, dk+1 ≤ qek + γ(ru) + 2γl.
By definition, ek+1 = dk+1 + 2γ
l
m
. Thus,
ek+1 ≤ qek + γ(ru) + 2γl + 2γlm. (3.2)
Recursively applying (3.2) from k = 1 (with e1 = γ
l
m
), we have:
ek+1 ≤
(
γ(ru) + 2γ
l
m
+ 2γl

) k∑
i=0
qi − qk(γ(ru) + 2γl),
the right hand side of which contains a sum of the geometric series with sum equal to 11−q , and a
negative term that approaches to 0 as k approaches ∞. So we have that
lim
k→∞
ek =
γ(ru) + 2γ
l
m
+ 2γl

1− q , (3.3)
that serves as a constant bound for the errors {ek}bT/(mδ)ck=1 .
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Next we consider the special case of the unforced version of dynamics (3.1) with ~u(t) = 0,
namely,
~˙v = fl(~v, 0), (3.4)
where fl is locally Lipschitz in ~v ∈ Rn. Then similar to Definition 8, we have:
Definition 9. Dynamics (3.4) is incremental globally asymptotically stable (δ-GAS for short) or
incremental stable [64, 65] if there exists a function β ∈ KL so that for any t ≥ 0 and any ~v,~v′ ∈ Rn
the following holds:
‖τ~v,0(t)− τ~v′,0(t)‖ ≤ β(‖~v − ~v′‖, t).
By comparing Definition 9 with Definition 8, and replacing γ(ru) with 0 all throughout the
proof of Theorem 3, we can obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 4.1. For unforced flow(l) that is δ-GAS, ∃c ∈ Z+, ∀m ≥ c such that the over-
approximation error sequence {ek}bT/(mδ)ck=1 has a constant bound under Algorithm 4, given by:
lim
k→∞
ek =
2(γl
m
+ γl

)
1− q . (3.5)
Now consider the special case of a stable LTI system. For such a system ~˙v = A~v + B~u with
Hurwitz matrix A, we can easily identify the associated KL function β and K∞ function γ by taking
advantage of its explicit solution:
~v(t) = eAt~v(0) +
∫ t
0
eA(t−ξ)B~u(ξ)dξ,
and use the bound ‖eAt‖ ≤ ke−λt, ∀t ≥ 0 for some k, λ > 0. Therefore, for any ~v,~v′ ∈ Rn and any
pair of bounded input signals ~u(t), ~u′(t),
‖τ~v,~u(t)(t)− τ~v′,~u′(t)(t)‖ = ‖eAt(~v − ~v′)‖+
∫ t
0
eA(t−ξ)‖B(~u(ξ)− ~u′(ξ))‖dξ
≤ ke−λt‖~v − ~v′‖+
∫ t
0
ke−λ(t−ξ)‖B(~u(ξ)− ~u′(ξ))‖dξ
≤ ke−λt‖~v − ~v′‖+ k‖B‖
λ
sup
0≤ξ≤t
‖~u(ξ)− ~u′(ξ)‖.
This not only shows the δ-ISS property of the above system, but also an exponential decay of the
deviation of the unforced trajectories. Consequently, we can have the following corollary:
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Corollary 4.2. For an LTI dynamics ~˙v = A~v + B~u with A Hurwitz, ∃c ∈ Z+ such that ∀m ≥ c,
the over-approximation error sequence {ek}bT/(mδ)ck=1 has a constant bound under Algorithm 4.
Remark 3. Once a constant bound on the over-approximation error sequence {ek}bT/(mδ)ck=1 is
guaranteed, then the number of simulation trajectories is bounded. So consider replacing input
{~v0} with a non-singleton representative set of initial states in Algorithm 4. Then we will have
e1 ≤ qD(V0) + γ(ru) + 2γl + 2γlm. Using this as the initial value for the sequence {ek}
bT/(mδ)c
k=1 , we
can have
ek ≤
(
γ(ru) + 2γ
l
m
+ 2γl

) k∑
i=0
qi + qkD(V0). (3.6)
On the right hand side of (3.6), the second term decays as long as D(V0) is bounded, regardless of
its size. Thus, the sequence {ek}bT/(mδ)ck=1 converges to the same value as in (3.3), regardless of the
diameter of the bounded set V0, as summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.3. For dynamics of δ-ISS or δ-GAS property, ∃c ∈ Z+ such that ∀m ≥ c, the over-
approximation error sequence {ek}bT/(mδ)ck=1 converges to the same value as in (3.3) under Algorithm 4
for any bounded initial set V0.
Remark 4. In (3.5), γl
m
, γl

, and hence ek, can be made arbitrarily small, by choosing sufficiently
small partition and simulation parameters rv, , and δ. While the constant error bound is achieved
regardless of the choices of these parameters, improving those can help to get a smaller constant
bound. On the other hand, while smaller m is, smaller γl
m
and γl

become, yet a small m may not
guarantee the trajectory convergence. This is because for a small m, the condition q < 1 in (3.2)
may not hold. In implementation, m is given a default value by rule-of-thumb if not user-specified.
Remark 5. In (3.3), a sufficiently small ru also makes γ(ru) sufficiently small. In this chapter
we focus on the partitions of the state set, we have fixed ru as for our algorithms for simplicity.
Theoretically, a bounded range of inputs can also be partitioned into smaller subranges, with the
assumption of piecewise constant inputs remaining intact. Then for each input subrange, we can
compute as in Algorithm 4, and perform union of the over-approximation state sets thus computed.
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3.4.2 Benefits from Dynamic Partitions
The main advantage of the dynamic partitioning scheme adopted by Algorithm 4 is that it
keeps the error growth under control while using only a Lipschitz-based discrepancy function,
that can be practically computed. (In contrast, there is no low complexity technique to obtain
a more precise discrepancy function, but if it is available, our Algorithm 4 can certainly also use
it.) Theorem 4 and its corollaries in section 3.4 show that Algorithm 4 achieves constant error
bound in case of stable dynamics, without requiring the β and γ functions of Definitions 8 and 9.
Thus Algorithm 4 provides an approach for simulation-based reachability analysis, even when the
specialized discrepancy functions are not provided.
A consequence of dynamic partitioning is that, the number of simulation trajectories in Algo-
rithm 4 is dynamic and decided in run-time, running only as many simulations as necessary, and
this number can even reduce. This number is related to the size of the error, and if that decreases
(as for example in case of a convergent system), then the number of simulation runs also decreases.
Corollary 4.3 suggests that, the error sequence approaches a constant value implying that the num-
ber of simulation trajectories become constant, and in fact may be smaller than the initial number.
Thus, the analysis can even speed up and eventually settle down.
3.5 The Overall Algorithm
Algorithm 4 is extended to obtain the overall Algorithm 5 for the reachability over-approximation
of a hybrid automaton A in a bounded time T , with partition parameter rv, simulation time-step δ,
the repartition time-step period number m, piecewise bounded input signal ~u(t) ∈ Bru(~u0(t)) with
its nominal piecewise constant input signal ~u0(t), and simulation time-step δ. W.l.o.g., we assume
the initial discrete location to be l0 and the initial continuous states V0 ⊆ inv(l0).
In line 1, Rl is the overall reachable set over-approximation within discrete mode l that is
forward simulated as in Algorithm 3; Lre is the over-approximation of the reachable location set;
C l is the set of representative states in Rl. The loop over lines 2-28 expands Algorithm 4 to account
for concurrent continuous evolution in multiple locations, as well as the state-triggered discrete
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Algorithm 5: Multi-step computation of the bounded-time reachable location/state set
over-approximation for general hybrid automaton.
Input: A = (L, V,E, V0, U, flow, inv, guard, reset), l0, rv, ru, ~u0(t), T,m, δ.
1 ∀l ∈ L \ l0, Rl ← ∅; Rl0 ← V0; Lre ← {l0};∀l ∈ L \ l0, C l ← ∅; C l0 ← Partition(V0, rv);
2 for i = 0; i < dT/δe; i+ + do
3 foreach l ∈ Lre do
4 R[i,i+1](C
l, ~u0(t)) =
⋃
~v∈Cl R[i,i+1](~v, ~u0(t));
5 Rl ← Rl ∪
(
inv(l) ∩R[i,i+1](C l, ~u0(t))
)
;
6 end
7 foreach ~v ∈ C l do
8 if Rli(~v, ~u0(t)) ∩ inv(l) = ∅ then
9 C l ← C l \ {~v};
10 end
11 end
12 foreach l′ ∈ {l∗ | (l, l∗) ∈ E} do
13 Face(l,l′) = reset(l,l′)(R[i,i+1](C
l, ~u0(t)) ∩ guard((l, l′)));
14 Face(l,l′) ← Face(l,l′) \
⋃
~v∈Cl′ Brv(~v);
15 if Face(l,l′) 6= ∅ then
16 Lre ← Lre ∪ {l′};
17 C l
′
new = Partition(Face(l,l′), rv);
18 if R[0,1](C
l′
new, ~u0(t)) \ inv(l′) 6= ∅ then
19 return Zeno alarm;
20 end
21 Rl
′ ← Rl′ ∪R[0,1](C l′new, ~u0(t));
22 C l
′ ← C l′ ∪ C l′new;
23 end
24 end
25 if (i > 0) ∧ (i%m = 0) then
26 C l ←Partition(⋃~v∈Cl Rli(~v, ~u0(t)), rv);
27 end
28 end
Output: Lre, {Rl}l∈Lre
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jumps in the context of hybrid automaton. The inner loop lines 3-27 compute the single time-step
continuous and discrete reachability over-approximation from each current reachable location. In
line 4, R[i,i+1](C
l, ~u0(t)) denotes the reachable set over-approximation from the states covered by
C l and under input signal ~u(t) ∈ Bru(~u0(t)) defined over time interval [iδ, (i+1)δ]. It is the union of
the tube segments propagating from C l computed individually by Algorithm 3. Line 5 updates Rl,
adding the newly reached set over-approximation within inv(l). Lines 6-10 check each simulation
starting point ~v ∈ C l, and remove it from C l if its reachable set over-approximation at time-step i,
denoted Rli(~v, ~u0(t)) (see Remark 6 below), has exited inv(l).
Remark 6. Suppose a representative state ~v ∈ C l is created at time-step j, then at time-step
j ≤ i ≤ j + m, we have Rli(~v, ~u0(t)) = Bγl
i−j
(~vi−j). In Algorithm 4, all representative states in l
are created via partitions. But in Algorithm 5, they can also be generated via discrete jumps from
other locations as in lines 16-21. Thus the computation of Rli(~v, ~u0(t)) may vary accordingly.
Lines 11-23 detect and handle all possible outgoing discrete jumps from l. For each possible
discrete jump (l, l′) as shown in Figure 3.4, line 12 defines its entry face, denoted by Face(l,l′), as
the set of states reached upon reset from the states that trigger guard((l, l′)).
Figure 3.4: Discrete jump and value reset. Blue shadowed area is the union of all tube segments of
[iδ, (i+ 1)δ].
Line 13 refines Face(l,l′) to remove the states already represented by C
l′ . In lines 14-22, a
one-step reachability computation within l′ is performed starting from the nonempty Face(l,l′), to
over-approximate the post-jump continuous evolution in l′ for the remainder sample time (so its
sum with the pre-jump evolution time equals δ). Specifically, line 15 updates the reachable location
set due to a jump; line 16 generates new representative set C l
′
new by partitioning the reachability
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over-approximation in l′; lines 17-19 check if the one-step reachability over-approximation stays
within inv(l′) and returns a “Zeno alarm” otherwise (see Remark 7); line 20 updates Rl′ with the
one-step reachable set over-approximation and line 21 adds C l
′
new into existing C
l′ .
Remark 7. The one-step reachable set over-approximation computed in line 16 may trigger a
discrete jump from l′ to some l′′, which requires another one-step over-approximation in l′′ , and
so on, all in one single sample time-step. Under our assumption of minimum dwell-time and the
choice of a sample time-step smaller than the dwell-time, we expect this situation to not arise. But
as a precaution, in this case, we let the algorithm terminate and report a “Zeno alarm” message.
Lines 23-25 periodically generate partitions, as in Algorithm 4, using rv-hypercube cells to cover
the over-approximation set at the current final time. Algorithm 5 returns the reachable location set
over-approximation Lre and the reachable state set over-approximation Rl for each l ∈ Lre. Both
Lre and {Rl}l∈Lre are updated at each time-step until time bound T is reached. We now establish
the correctness of Algorithm 5 as follows.
Theorem 5. Algorithm 5 is correct. That is, in the case of no Zeno alarm, if some ~v∗ ∈ inv(l∗) is
reachable from some ~v0 ∈ V0 ⊆ inv(l0) under the input ~u0(t) ∈ Bru(~u0(t)) over [0, T ], then l∗ ∈ Lre
and ~v∗ ∈ Rl∗.
Proof. If l∗ = l0 and ~v∗ is reachable from ~v0 ∈ V0 ⊆ inv(l0) without any discrete jump, then l0 ∈ Lre
by default and it follows from Theorem 4 that ~v∗ ∈ Rl∗ .
Otherwise, consider the execution α from ~v0 ∈ V0 to ~v∗ ∈ inv(l∗) within [0, T∗]. Then α has
a finite length, and let α = τ0e1τ1 . . . ekτk, where ei = (li−1, li) is a discrete jump, and τi with
local time variable ti ∈ [0, Ti] is a continuous trajectory in li. By Definition 7, we have τ0(0) = ~v0,
τk(Tk) = ~v∗ and lk = l∗.
Regarding the discrete jumps, by Definition 7, we have:
T∗ = Σkj=0Tj ≤ T, (3.7)
and, for 0 ≤ i ≤ k,
τi+1(0) = reset(li,li+1)(τi(Ti)). (3.8)
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Let Rli≤j denote the value of R
li after the jth iteration of lines 2-27 in Algorithm 5. It’s easy to see
that:
∀j ∈ [0, dT/δe − 1], Rli≤j ⊆ Rli≤j+1, and ∀j ∈ [0, dT/δe], Rlij ⊆ Rli≤j .
Next, we prove ∀ti ∈ [0, Ti], τi(ti) ∈ Rli≤dT∗/δe for 0 ≤ i ≤ k by induction.
For base step i = 0, τ0(0) ∈ Rl0≤0 holds by the initial condition. From Theorem 3, we have
∀t0 ∈ [0, T0], τ0(t0) ∈ Rl0≤dT0/δe.
For the inductive step, assume li ∈ Lre and ∀ti ∈ [0, Ti], τi(ti) ∈ Rli≤dΣij=0Tj/δe. Then τi(Ti) ∈
Rli≤dΣij=0Tj/δe
. It implies that the discrete transition (li, li+1) was executed at some time-step s ≤
dΣij=0Tj/δe. Thus from (3.8) we have,
τi+1(0) = reset(li,li+1)(τi(Ti)) ∈ Face(li, li+1).
Face(li, li+1) is covered by either the existing or the new representative set at time-step s. Hence,
∀ti+1 ∈ [0, δ], τi+1(ti+1) ∈ Rli+1≤s , (3.9)
owing to correctness of Algorithm 3 by Theorem 3. From (3.9) we know τi+1(δ) ∈ Rli+1≤s . Then
from Theorem 3, we have:
∀ti+1 ∈ [δ, Ti+1], τi+1(ti+1) ∈ Rli+1≤s+d(Ti+1−δ)/δe. (3.10)
From s ≤ dΣij=0Tj/δe, we have:
s+ d(Tj+1 − δ)/δe ≤ dΣij=0Tj/δe+ dTi+1/δe − 1 ≤ dΣi+1j=0Tj/δe. (3.11)
Combining (3.9)-(3.11), we can conclude:
∀ti+1 ∈ [0, Ti+1], τi+1(ti+1) ∈ Rli+1≤dΣi+1j=0Tj/δe.
Together with the base step and inductive step, we have:
~v∗ = τk(Tk) ∈ Rlk≤dΣkj=0Tk/δe = R
l∗
≤dT∗/δe,
with T∗ = Σkj=0Tj from (3.7), and lk = l∗ by definition. Since T∗ ≤ T , we have ~v∗ ∈ Rl∗≤dT/δe = Rl∗ .
Finally, in lines 15-16, Algorithm 5 adds any reachable location l to Lre the first time l is
reached. Thus we can also conclude that by the time-step i = dT∗/δe, l∗ ∈ Lre.
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Algorithm 5 introduces extra over-approximation error when handling discrete jumps. Specif-
ically, the maximum error from partitioning the entry face after reset is rv, and then there is the
error from one-step over-approximation. Both can be made arbitrarily small by the choice of par-
tition/simulation parameters. For safety verification against an unsafe zone Sunsafe, we can simply
extend Algorithm 5 by inserting a line for checking the nonemptiness of Sunsafe ∩
⋃
l∈Lre R
l after
line 27. Empty intersection indicates system safety. Otherwise, the system may still be safe, and
to ascertain this, we may increase the granularity of partition by replacing rv with rv/2 and re-
executing Algorithm 5. Like all other algorithms for hybrid system safety verification, the iteration
doesn’t guarantee termination due to the inherent undecidability of the problem.
Remark 8. If the safety verification is the only goal, the partition function can be further enhanced
for computational efficiency. An enhanced function Partition(S, rv) returns the set of representative
states that cover only the boundary of S (or its convex hull). This is because any trajectory that
starts from the interior of S has to traverse through the boundary before it reaches any exterior
portion. Boundary partition gives representative set of size O(D(S)), compared to O((D(S))2) for
a bounded region S.
3.6 Implementation and Experimental Results
3.6.1 Implementation and Architecture
We developed a prototype tool, Hybrid System Step Simulation Verifier (HS3V), that implements
our algorithms using C# for the bounded-time reachability over-approximation for general hybrid
systems. Figure 3.5 shows its architecture. It contains seven main modules including a core step
procedure engine of four modules. Program interacts with three open source license libraries to
facilitate data processing. Modules and their functionalities are list as follows:
• Model Parser: This module accepts input files (in .txt or .xml format), parsing the syn-
tactical lines in each input file, and passes the data containing the description information of
the model and safety specification to the Verifier’s step procedure engine.
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Figure 3.5: Architecture of HS3V.
• Partitioner: This module generates the representative state set of a bounded region S using
cell radius parameter γ. The state space is partitioned into uniform γ-hypercubes. Then
the representative set, i.e. the center points of the γ-hypercubes overlapping S, is of size
O((D(S))2). Further improvement is done by selecting the center points of γ-hypercubes
that cover only the boundary of S (or its convex hull) to get the representative set of size
O(D(S)).
• Simulator: This module generates simulation trajectories whose simulation values are com-
puted using ALGLIB 2.0 [66].
• Tube Builder: This module builds tube segments around simulation values by Algorithm 3,
using Clipper [67] for polygon operations.
• Visualizer: This module plots the reachable tubes (and other optional data) using Gnuplot
[68].
• Condition Checker: This module checks the current reachable set over-approximation
against guard conditions and unsafe set, also using Clipper. When the safety specification is
violated, partition parameter is refined to restart the verification process.
• Textual Reporter: This module generates a textual report regarding the safety satisfaction
after the step procedure has been repeated till the given time bound.
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3.6.2 Experimental Results
Example 3. (Double-Integrator System [32]). Consider a double-integrator, such as a point moving
along a 1-d line, controlled through its acceleration. The dynamics are x˙ = v, v˙ = a, where
the acceleration a is set periodically by a PD controller with gains P = 10 and D = 3. The
controller update function periodically assigns a := P ∗ (1− x) +D ∗−v. The period of the control
task is T = 0.005 seconds. The system has a fixed point of x = 1.
We study the system’s position response over 5 seconds, with initial state x ∈ [0, 0.1] and v = 0.
Results of simulation and over-approximation using three existing tools are shown in Figure 3.6.
(a) (b)
(c)
(d)
‘
Figure 3.6: (a) Matlab Simulation output. (b) SpaceEx output. (c) Flow* output with original
model. (d) Flow* output with Hyst translated model. All plots in Figure 3.6 are taken from [32]
without modification.
Although the simulation may suggest that x stabilizes at 1, both SpaceEx and Flow* give
divergent reachability due to the errors introduced in frequent discrete transitions. SpaceEx uses a
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support function representation of the reachable set, which is not efficient in performing intersection
and deciding containment – operations often used in determining if a guard is triggered or an
safety condition is violated. Thus, SpaceEx has to introduce polyhedral representation into the
verification algorithm, causing extra over-approximating translations at the times of the discrete
transitions. Flow* uses Taylor Model representation and suffers from similar issues. Flow* gives
a better result on Hyst [31, 32] translated model. Hyst over-approximates the original frequently
switching continuously-controlled system with a continuously-controlled system with additional
bounded non-deterministic input, resulting in the so-called continuization, which eliminates a large
number of discrete transitions, thereby eliminating error growth caused by set transformations.
Similar approach was also seen in [69].
For our tool, HS3V, we set the simulation time-step δ = 0.0025s, the state partition parameter
rv = 0.003. Let (x0, v0) be one representative point of the initial zone. The reference trajectory
evolves according to x˙
v˙
 =
0 1
0 0

x
v
+
0
1
 a, (3.12)
with x(0) = x0, v(0) = v0 and piecewise constant input signal a(t) = (10 − 10x(iδ) − 3v(iδ)) over
[2iδ, 2(i + 1)δ) for i ∈ Z≥0. Tube segments for the first 0.005s (2 time-steps) can be built with
the initial state set Brv((x0, v0)), in which a(t) ranges over B13rv(10− 10x0 − 3v0). At t = 0.005s,
forward simulation continues from a current representative value (x2, v2) with input range updated
to B13γ
2
(10 − 10x2 − 3v2). In general, at the ith control update, input value for simulation is
updated to 10− 10x2i − 3v2i and input range is updated to B13γ
2i
(10− 10x2i − 3v2i).
Figure 3.7 compares the reachability results for variable x before and after applying dynamic
repartitioning. Figure 3.7(a) gives good result within 3s, after which the error starts to grow
rapidly. This agrees with the exponential growth with Lipschitz constant 1 (see equation (3.12)).
Figure 3.7(b) using dynamic repartitioning with parameter m = 160 (γ
m
≈ 1.5γ0), shows much
improved result converging to a constant deviation comparable to the simulation result.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.7: (a) HS3V output with exponential error growth without dynamic repartitioning. (b)
HS3V output with dynamic repartitioning happening inside dashed circles.
Example 4. (Brusselator system). It is a nonlinear model for a type of auto-catalytic reaction.
The system’s behavior is captured by the differential equations x˙ = 1+x2y−2.5x and y˙ = 1.5x−x2y.
Suppose µ = 1 and initial set x ∈ [1.25, 1.3] ∧ y ∈ [2.25, 2.3]. We again use a simulation
time-step of 0.01s and the state partition parameter γ of 0.001. The reachability results computed
before (red) and after (blue) applying dynamic repartitioning are shown in Figure 3.8. The later
outperforms the former over time that accuracy is maintained: [0, 7]s compared to [0, 1]s.
Figure 3.8: HS3V output for Brusselator system.
Example 5. (Bouncing ball) This is a classic example of a hybrid system. The continuous dy-
namics is given by v˙ = −g and h˙ = v where g is the acceleration due to gravity, h is the height
of the ball and v is the velocity. The hybrid aspect of the model stems from modeling the collision
of the ball with the ground as a partially elastic collision that causes energy loss. Accordingly, the
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bouncing ball displays a jump v+ = −cv−, where c ∈ [0, 1] is a constant, at the transition guard
condition, h = 0.
The bouncing ball may exhibit Zeno behavior since each time the ball bounces, it loses energy,
making the subsequent jumps closer in time. From Theorem 5, the correctness of the analysis
result can be guaranteed until a Zeno alarm is triggered. Let the constant of elastic collisions
c = 0.75. Suppose the initial zone is h ∈ [10, 10.1] ∧ v = 0, the simulation time-step δ = 0.01s,
and the state partition parameter γ = 0.003. Figure 3.9 shows the reachability results, comparing
before (red) and after (blue) applying dynamic repartitioning. The later maintains accuracy of
over-approximation for over [0, 20]s. Both reachability over-approximation show correct and fully
automatic discrete transitions with the guard and the reset corresponding to the collision event.
Figure 3.9: HS3V output for bouncing ball system.
3.6.3 Performance
All the experiments in this section were performed on a computer with 8G memory and Intel
Core @2.30GHz processor. Operating system used was Windows 7 x64. Table 3.1 gives perfor-
mance of HS3V on the benchmarks with dynamic repartitioning. Each benchmark is experimented
with three parameter settings. For each benchmark, the setting used by the figure in the previous
subsection is marked by *. Since the number of simulation time-steps is not fixed in our algo-
rithms, we only present the maximum number of simulation branches during program execution
for simplicity.
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From the table, one can see that the execution time of the program is roughly propositional to
the number of time-steps and the (maximum) number of simulation trajectories. Figure 3.10 shows
the trade-off between the execution time versus the precision, via the Brusselator benchmark. By
allowing finer granularity of partition, precision improves, while computation time goes up. The
error bound of precision can be calculated using the bounds provided in the chapter.
Table 3.1: Table of Performance on benchmarks.
Set. Benchmark T (sec) stepNo. m(step) simNo. time(sec)
1 DIS 5 1000 300 22 4.93
2 DIS 5 1000 80 22 9.44
3 DIS* 5 2000 160 64 13.01
4 Bruss 10 333 55 63 5.19
5 Bruss 10 333 15 64 7.62
6 Bruss* 10 1000 40 96 23.37
7 VDP 10 333 55 246 10.37
8 VDP 10 333 15 295 25.84
9 VDP* 10 1000 40 278 29.41
10 B.Ball 10 333 55 191 8.25
11 B.Ball 10 333 15 226 18.62
12 B.Ball* 10 1000 40 238 38.25
Set.: experimental setting index,T: time bound, stepNo.: number of total time-steps, m: partition
period, simNo: maximum simulation trajectories during program execution, time: program
execution time.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.10: (a) With Setting 5 in Table 3.1, HS3V execution time is 7.62s. (b) With Setting 6 in
Table 3.1, HS3V execution time is 23.37s.
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CHAPTER 4. “ReLIC: REDUCED LOGIC INFERENCE FOR
COMPOSITION” FOR QUANTIFIER ELIMINATION BASED
COMPOSITIONAL REASONING AND VERIFICATION
4.1 Introduction
From compositional perspective, distributed cyber-physical systems (CPSs) integrate physical
dynamical components with computing hardware and software, interconnected over an embedded
communication network. For example, Unmanned Systems Autonomy Services (UxAS) software
system [70] consists of a collection of modular services that interact via a common message passing
architecture. It provides a framework to construct and deploy software services that are used to en-
able autonomous capabilities by flexibly implementing autonomy algorithms on-board Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAV)s [71]. Successful missions engaging autonomous actions of the UAVs require
highly dependable design. Within the model-based verification paradigm, compositional reason-
ing is employed for scalability, by utilizing composition of component properties to establish the
properties of a system made out of those components. The component-based compositional design
paradigm emphasizes the separation of concerns with respect to the system design through a modu-
lar and reuse based paradigm for defining, implementing, and composing components into systems.
In this chapter, we establish that “quantifier elimination” provides a foundation for compositional
reasoning, and also can be used to aid formal verification and model-checking.
Quantifier elimination (QE) is a powerful technique for gaining insight, through simplification,
into problems involving logic expressions in various theories. QE is essentially a projection problem
where a formula is projected to a lower dimension over only its free variables. For example, over the
field of reals, ∃x(y > x2) is equivalent to y > 0 (since x2 can only be non-negative), in which the
quantified variable x has been eliminated or projected out. A theory admits quantifier elimination
if for every formula in this theory, there is an equivalent quantifier-free formula. It has been proved
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that the real closed field and an extension of Presburger arithmetic (a linear theory of integers)
both admit QE [72, 73]. This makes the QE applicable to many real world applications.
While Tarski [72] showed that the first-order logic over the real closed field admits quantifier
elimination, it was Collins who in 1975, introduced the first implementable quantifier elimination
procedure, based on cylindrical algebraic decomposition (CAD) [74]. Over the past few decades, the
QE techniques and tools have undergone further enrichment, and the efforts made along the way
have contributed to newer additions. In particular, specialized procedures for restricted problem
classes led to newer, more advanced QE procedures, documented in tools such as Mathematica,
Redlog, and Qecad. For example, Redlog [4], implements virtual substitution [75, 76] and partial
CAD [77] algorithms, that work for formulae where the degrees of the quantified variables are small.
Many problems in systems and controls can be formulated as formulae in the first-order logic
of real closed field. QE was applied in [78] to solve nonlinear continuous control system design
with simple properties. In [79, 80], QE was used to compute exact reachable sets for linear systems
with certain eigen-structures and semi-algebraic initial sets, and this method was generalized in
[81] to handle linear systems with almost arbitrary eigen-structures. Further, [82, 83] extended the
application of real QE to formal verification and synthesis of continuous and switched dynamical
systems. QE solvers are also used as back-end reasoning engines in the bounded model-checking
based algorithm in [84] and in the theorem prover for hybrid systems KeYmaera [85].
In this chapter, we establish that QE can provide a foundation for compositional reasoning, that
are techniques being developed to cope with state-space explosion in concurrent systems [86, 87,
88, 89]. Essentially the strategy of divide-and-conquer is being employed where one first establishes
the properties of the system components, and then uses those to establish the global properties of a
complex system. Initially, during component development phase, each component is annotated with
an assume-guarantee style contract. Supposing a system is composed of N components, the contract
formula of the ith component can be expressed as Ai ⇒ Gi where Ai (the “assumption”), Gi (it’s
“guarantee”) are both expressed by formulae over the set of component variables. Then the set of all
the system behaviors is constrained by the conjunction of all the components’ contracts
∧N
i=1(Ai ⇒
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Gi). Under these contracts, we show that the strongest system property, that can be claimed that
the system satisfies, can be obtained by existentially quantifying the system’s internal variables
in the conjunct of
∧N
i=1(Ai ⇒ Gi) and the constraints resulting from the connectivity relation
among the components. Thus we establish that QE serves as a foundation for property/contract
composition. Now to check whether a system satisfies a postulated property, we only need to check
if the postulated property is implied by the aforementioned strongest system property. This in
itself can be cast as a QE problem.
Another important contribution of our work is the extension of QE-based property composition
to the case of time-dependent properties, which can depend on a (finite) history of input/output
variables. We show that the composed property may involve a longer history, but no more than the
cumulative histories of all its components. Accordingly, we introduce the notion of property order,
deduction of system order, and the composition of given properties along with their time-shifted
replicas to infer the strongest system property. We have implemented our QE-based compositional
verification approach in a prototype tool, ReLIC (Reduced Logic Inference for Composition), based
on the integration of Redlog with AGREE [2, 86, 90]—the former supports QE, while the latter is
a compositional analyzer for a system and its components described in the modeling framework
of AADL [1]. Our integration uses only the front-end of AGREE for specifying system architec-
ture/connectivity, components, and their properties in AADL and AGREE annex, and reporting the
result of composition to the user.
In addition to using QE for compositional reasoning, we also show that the problem of sat-
isfiability checking used in formal verification and model-checking can be reduced to one of QE.
Specifically, we consider the verification scheme based on k-induction [3, 91, 92, 93], implemented
for example as JKind [5], that is used to verify invariant properties of programs written in the lan-
guage Lustre [94]. Under this scheme, to prove a transition system satisfies some invariant property,
one needs to prove the base case and the inductive case for some k. For each step, the verification
of the base (or inductive) case can be reduced to an instance of an SMT (Satisfiability Modulo The-
ory) problem, namely checking the satisfiability of a first-order logic formula. Thus SMT-solving is
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integral to k-induction based verification. QE can offer alternatives for SMT-solving since checking
the satisfiability of a formula φ(x1, . . . , xn) in n-variables is equivalent to checking that the exis-
tentially quantified formula ∃x1 . . . ∃xnφ(x1, . . . , xn) evaluates to true or false. Thus with regards
to satisfiability, the capability of SMT solvers and QE solvers overlap, and can vary depending on
the algorithms they employ and the theories they support. The accumulated experimental data
provided in [95] has shown that Redlog along with other QE tools can offer advantage over SMT
solvers like Z3, iSAT, cvc3, specially for non-linear arithmetic, in terms of the execution time, and
the range of problems those can solve. To provide alternative options of back-end solvers to model-
checkers, we have implemented the integration of Redlog with JKind, so SMT-solving can also be
performed based on quantifier-elimination. This thereby enhances JKind’s ability of checking prop-
erties that may involve nonlinearity. A related application is the generation of property-directed
invariants by using QE in a k-induction-based framework [96].
In summary, the key contributions of the presented work are:
• Establish quantifier elimination as a foundation for property composition.
• Introduce the notion of strongest system property that can be inferred from the given compo-
nent properties and their connectivity relation, and provide a QE-based derivation approach.
• Extend the QE-based property composition formalism to time-dependent properties involving
temporal behavior.
• Implementation of the above in a new tool called ReLIC, that integrates a quantifier elim-
ination tool Redlog with another tool AGREE that supports AADL specification of system
architecture and component properties.
• Establish QE has an alternative choice for SMT-solving to be used by model-checkers.
• Implement within ReLIC the integration of QE solver Redlog with the model-checker JKind.
• Demonstrate the working of our implementations on simple illustrative examples.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the integration of Redlog
with JKind to provide the model-checker with an additional solver option. Section 4.3 describes
our framework for QE-based property composition, along with the developed prototype tool ReLIC
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for time-independent/temporal property composition. Section 4.4 provides the extension of QE-
based property composition to compose time-dependent properties. Each of these sections provides
illustrative examples of the said implementations.
4.2 QE support for Verification: Integration of Redlog with JKind
4.2.1 Preliminary
One approach for formal verification is bounded or k-induction model-checking. In this section
we demonstrate how QE can be used to aid k-induction based verification. The tool JKind [5]
supports k-induction proofs for transition systems described in Lustre [90]. It is based on a precursor
tool Kind [92], to make it platform independent and easily integratable into Java-based tools.
Before describing the tools, we briefly recall the formulation of k-induction [3, 92]. Consider
a transition system S specified in some logic L, by an initial state condition I(x) and transition
relation T (x, x′), where x, x′ are state variable vectors. Let x(i) denote the variable at the ith time
step. Then a state property φ(x) is invariant for S, i.e., satisfied by every reachable state of S, if
the following base and inductive conditions hold in L for some k ∈ Z≥1 and for any n ∈ Z≥0:
• I(x(0)) ∧∧k−2i=0 T (x(i), x(i+ 1))⇒ ∧k−1i=0 φ(x(i));
• ∧n+k−1i=n T (x(i), x(i+ 1)) ∧∧n+k−1i=n φ(x(i))⇒ φ(x(n+ k)).
The first condition checks the base case that φ(x) is satisfied at each step from an initial state of
S for k steps. Any violation of this condition yields a concrete counterexample that falsifies the
property φ. The second condition describes the inductive case, which checks that if φ holds at each
state along a k-step trace, then φ also holds at the state reached in k+ 1 steps. A counterexample
trace for the inductive step does not necessarily yield a concrete counterexample because it may
start from an unreachable state of S. On the other hand, in order to prove the invariance of φ
over all states, the base and inductive cases must be true for some k. Hence a normal way of
a k-induction proof starts with k = 0, and increments k as necessary to rule out any spurious
counterexamples generated in an induction case. Induction based verification approach doesn’t
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guarantee termination for the general case (the problem in general is undecidable), so an a priori
bound on k is specified to prevent entering into an indefinite loop.
The model-checker JKind supports bounded model-checking using k-induction proofs on tran-
sition systems described in Lustre [94]. Figure 4.1 illustrates the general architecture of JKind. It
takes, as input, a Lustre based description, containing system model and properties to be checked,
and spawns three processes, respectively for base case, inductive case, and invariant generation
case. The invariant generation case tries to prove some candidate invariants from pre-defined tem-
plates, that could be used to facilitate the base or induction case proofs by strengthening their
hypotheses. Each process interacts with its own copy of an SMT solver at the back-end. All three
processes are coordinated under a director, exchanging messages asynchronously. The SMT results
are interpreted to produce the verification output.
Figure 4.1: JKind architecture.
4.2.2 Reduction of SMT instance to QE instance
An SMT instance is a formula in a first-order logic, and the problem is to check whether such
a formula is satisfiable. A formula φ(x1, . . . xn), with x1 . . . xm as un-quantified free variables, is
satisfiable if and only if there exists an assignment of the free variables that makes the formula
evaluate to true. The same can be expressed as a QE instance, ∃x1 . . . ∃xmφ(x1, . . . xn), and now
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since all the variables in φ(x1, . . . xn) are quantified, the equivalent quantifier-free formula that
a QE process returns is either true or false. In the case of former, a satisfiable assignment of
(x1 . . . xn) is also returned.
State-of-art SMT solvers such as Z3 that are commonly used in the research community, support
linear/non-linear arithmetic in mixed integer/real domain and various data structures such as lists,
arrays, bit vectors etc. Redlog, On the other hand, each first-order formula in Redlog must
exclusively contain atoms from one particular Redlog-supported domain, which determines the
choice of admissible functions and relations with specified semantics. Redlog-supported domains
include non-linear real arithmetic (Tarski Algebra), Presburger arithmetic, parametric quantified
Boolean formulae, and others.
We have implemented (i) a translator from SMT-Lib 2.0 input format to Redlog input format,
named S2RTool, using the front-end parser generated by Antlr v4 [97], and (ii) a back-end inter-
preter written in Java. Also, we have reprogrammed the JKind director in Figure 4.1 to redirect its
output .smt2 files meant for SMT to S2RTool, along each of its three processes, as shown in Fig-
ure 4.2. The dotted arrows denote the redirected data flow after integration of JKind with Redlog,
whereas the solid arrows denote the original flow. The S2RTool’s translated output is received by
Redlog for QE-based SMT-solving; its results are processed by our interpreter before forwarding
those to JKind for a possible next round of induction iteration. A simple comparison example of
Z3 vs. Redlog inputs is shown in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.2: Data redirection in Redlog-integrated JKind.
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Figure 4.3: Z3 vs. Redlog.
Remark 9. Note while Redlog does not directly support mixed real-integer variables, the case of
mixed real/integer variables can still be handled as follows. If the integer variables are in bounded
ranges, then, in Redlog, the problem can be mapped to real domain as follows: for each integer
variable x, we append the formula
∨n
i=1(x = vi), where {v1, . . . , vn} is the set of possible integer
values of x. For the case of general mixed real/integer variables, where an integer variable may not
be finitely enumerated, we solve an over-approximation problem with all the variables interpreted in
the real domain. In this case, a “false” result of the over-approximation implies a “false” result of
the original problem. On the other hand, in a “true” case, if the assignment of x happens to be an
integer, this particular assignment is accepted for the original problem. Otherwise if the assignment
of x is not an integer, we simply report “unknown”.
4.2.3 Experimental result
We have successfully employed the Redlog-integrated JKind on many Lustre programs including
a fuzzy logic model involving non-linear computations. The fuzzy logic model contains 54 different
modes, and where a main program selects the correct mode depending on the conditions satisfied
by 4 real-valued inputs. Each mode invokes a call to a corresponding sub-program that computes
a specified 4th-order non-linear polynomial to arrive at the result for the only output variable. The
input/state/output variables are defined in real domain except the mode selection variable N is
an integer that varies from 1 to 54. For example, if the input satisfies the condition for the mode
N = 1, the following 4th-order non-linear polynomial computes the output: (−2.22222) ∗ x1in +
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(−2.00000)∗x2in+(−4.00000)∗x3in+(10.00000)∗x4in+(8.88889)∗x1in∗x2in+(7.40741)∗x1in∗
x3in+ (59.25926) ∗ x1in ∗ x4in+ (12.00000) ∗ x2in ∗ x3in+ (32.00000) ∗ x2in ∗ x4in+ (40.00000) ∗
x3in∗x4in+(−59.25926)∗x1in∗x2in∗x3in+(−177.77778)∗x1in∗x2in∗x4in+(−74.07407)∗x1in∗
x3in∗x4in+ (−240.00000)∗x2in∗x3in∗x4in+ (888.88889)∗x1in∗x2in∗x3in∗x4in+ (1.00000).
Figure 4.4: Verification of a fuzzy logic model using QE-integrated JKind.
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The Lustre program of the fuzzy logic model contains two properties to be verified, including
checking whether the fuzzy logic output remains bounded by 1 in magnitude. SMT-based JKind
is unable to resolve this problem since Z3 and other alternative SMT solvers fail to terminate. In
contrast, our QE-integrated JKind proves one property as valid and the second property as invalid,
reporting a concrete counterexample in less then 16 seconds on a standard laptop, during which
each query to Redlog spends less than 1 second. The log of QE-integrated JKind execution is
shown in Figure 4.4, where a concrete counterexample found to violate the boundedness property
of the output stated above is reported.
4.3 ReLIC for time-independent property composition
A modular approach to establishing system correctness involves the so-called, assume-guarantee
compositional paradigm [86, 87, 88, 89] within which, a module (component/system) contract is
specified by a pair (A,G), where A and G are first-order logic formulae: G describes the guaranteed
behavior of the module while A describes the assumed behavior of the environment with which the
module interacts. The contract itself expresses the requirement or property (A⇒ G). One aspect of
compositional verification aims to derive the system contract from the contracts of its components
together with their interactions through shared variables or event-synchronizations, that does not
reference any of the component models.
Example 6. For illustration, consider a simple case where two components connect in a cascade
composition, where their input/output properties are described by the formulae
(
(u1 ≥ 0) ⇒ (y1 ≥
0)
)
and
(
(u2 ≥ 0)⇒ (y2 ≥ 0)
)
respectively, where u and y denote input and output variables. Also,
owing to the cascade configuration, u2 = y1. Then it is easy to see that the cascaded system satisfies
the property
(
(u1 ≥ 0)⇒ (y2 ≥ 0)
)
.
Note this derivation, does not require the internal details of the components. [90] provides a
compositional reasoning approach that for a system with N components requires N +1 verification
steps to establish or refute a postulated system contract from the given component contracts:
one verification step for each component and one for the system as a whole. The component
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verification steps establish that the assumptions of each component are implied by the system-level
assumptions and the guarantees of all the upstream components. The system-level verification step
checks that the system guarantees follow from the system assumptions and the guarantees of the
components. A tool that supports compositional reasoning for components, their contracts, and
system architecture described in AADL [1] is AGREE. In this tool, while the architecture is described
in AADL, the properties in assume-guarantee style are specified within the AGREE annex. AGREE
uses JKind as its back-end model-checker for checking the above N + 1 conditions, and it itself
exists as a plug-in tool within the open-source Eclipse-based platform OSATE2 [98] that supports
AADL v2. The architecture of AGREE within OSATE2 is shown in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Architecture of AGREE plug-in within OSATE2 platform.
4.3.1 Proposed QE-based compositional verification
Our QE-based compositional reasoning approach is based upon the “strongest system property”,
derived from the given component-level properties. To introduce this notion, we first introduce some
notation. Consider a system S composed of N components. Let X := {x1, . . . , xn} be the set of all
the variables in S, Xint := {x1, . . . , xm} ⊆ X(m ≤ n), be the set of internal variables (namely, the
internal variables of components themselves along with the component inputs/outputs internalized
within the system), Xsys := X \Xint = {xm+1, . . . , xn} be the set of external variables (namely, the
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inputs and outputs of S), and C := {(xp, xq) | xp and xq are variables of connected ports in S} be
the set of connectivity relation among component variables. Suppose the ith component’s property
is described by a contract (Ai, Gi) in a certain first-order logic. We next define the strongest system
property and present a result that provides a method to derive it.
Definition 10. The strongest system property is the system property that implies any other system
properties established upon the given component properties and their connectivity relation.
Theorem 6. The strongest system property, established upon the component contracts and connec-
tivity relation of system S described above is given by,
∃x1 . . . ∃xm
( N∧
i=1
(Ai ⇒ Gi) ∧
∧
(xp,xq)∈C
(xp = xq)
)
. (4.1)
Proof. We prove this theorem by proving that indeed (4.1) is a system property, and that it implies
any other system property.
First, let V denote the valid signal values over X, and Vsys denote the valid signal values over
Xsys. By definition, Vsys is the projection of V from n to n − m dimensions. For any system-
level signal value ~vsys = (vm+1 . . . vn)
T ∈ Vsys, where (·)T denotes the transpose operation, it must
correspond to a component-level signal value ~v = (v1 . . . vn)
T ∈ V . Meanwhile, ~v ∈ V if and only
if: ( N∧
i=1
(Ai ⇒ Gi) ∧
∧
(xp,xq)∈C
(xp = xq)
)∣∣∣
~x=~v
≡ true, (4.2)
where (4.2) simply states that a valid signal value must comply with the components contracts and
the connectivity relation. Therefore when ~xsys = ~vsys, we have ~vint = (v1 . . . vm)
T that makes the
following formula true:
( N∧
i=1
(Ai ⇒ Gi) ∧
∧
(xp,xq)∈C
(xp = xq)
)∣∣∣
~xsys=~vsys
.
As a result, we have that any valid signal value, ~vsys satisfies:
∃x1 . . . ∃xm
( N∧
i=1
(Ai ⇒ Gi) ∧
∧
(xp,xq)∈C
(xp = xq)
)
. (4.3)
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(4.3) suggests that any system-level signal value satisfies (4.1), in another word, (4.1) is indeed a
system property.
Secondly, to show that (4.1) is also the strongest system property, assume φ is some given
system property of S. For any ~vsys that does not satisfies φ, ~vsys /∈ Vsys by definition. We need
to show that ~vsys 6|= (4.1). If this is false, then we can find v1, . . . , vm that together with ~vsys
forms a valid signal value in V . Since Vsys is the projection on xm+1, . . . , xn, we can conclude that
~vsys ∈ Vsys, thereby arriving at a contradiction. In summary, any signal value that violates φ, also
violates (4.1), alternatively speaking, (4.1) ⇒ φ, as desired.
Remark 10. Through (4.1) in Theorem 6, we have shown that property composition, in a component-
based compositional framework, is essentially a QE problem. Based on this insight, we have put forth
a two-step QE-based compositional verification procedure. The first step is to generate the strongest
system property, through a QE process of (4.1), applied to component contracts and connectivity
relation. The strongest system property upon QE, denoted φsys, contains only the system-level in-
put/output variables. The second step is to check if φsys implies any postulated system property
φpostl that also contains only system-level input/output variables. Note we can employ yet another
QE process ∀xm+1 . . . ∀xn(φsys ⇒ φpostl) to reduce the checking the implication φsys ⇒ φpostl to
“true” or “false”.
4.3.2 Implementation and experimental result
We have implemented a prototype tool ReLIC (Reduced Logic Inference for Composition) em-
ploying the above strategy of Remark 10, integrating AGREE (for system and component specification
in AADL) and Redlog (for QE). Within ReLIC, the AADL architecture description and the con-
tracts specified in the AGREE annex are abstracted and formulated into a QE problem in the Redlog
input format. Redlog acts as a back-end solver and interacts with AGREE as shown in Figure 4.6.
The figure also illustrates that the data flow of our QE-based compositional verification completely
bypasses JKind, removing the multi-step proof required under the AGREE’s model-checking scheme.
More importantly, our QE-based approach is able to automatically infer the strongest system
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property, given the component properties. This feature is missing from the current compositional
reasoning tools.
Figure 4.6: Data flow of compositional verification through Redlog.
Figure 4.7 shows an illustrative model example taken from [2], that we denote as system S.
It is composed of three components, whose architecture (components and connectivity relation)
is specified in an .aadl file. The assume-guarantee style component contracts for the components
A,B,C, and postulated contract for system S are as listed below:
• ContractA: (InA < 20)⇒ (OutA < 2× InA);
• ContractB: (InB < 20)⇒ (OutB < InB + 15);
• ContractC : true⇒ (OutC = InC1 + InC2);
• ContractS : (InS < 10)⇒ (OutS < 50).
Figure 4.7: An example model architecture, modified from [2].
Using the AGREE front-end, ReLIC can be executed by a newly added AGREE menu button
“Verify Composed Contract” as in Figure 4.8. Figure 4.9(a) shows the verification result of the
example interpreted in real domain, where the derived strongest system property (InS ≤ 10) ⇒
(OutS < 4 × InS + 15) is output to the OSATE2 console as shown in Figure 4.9(b). This is seen
to not imply the postulated ContractS , e.g., when (InS , OutS) is assigned the values (9, 50). A
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counterexample reported by Redlog is shown in Figure 4.9(c). Note that the Redlog counterex-
ample answer can contain constants named infinity or epsilon, both indexed by a number: All
infinity ’s are positive and infinite, and all epsilon’s are positive and infinitesimal with respect to
the underlying field.
Figure 4.8: Execution of ReLIC via AGREE command in OSATE2.
In contrast, in the integer domain, the strongest system property implies the postulated system
property, and the “Verify Composed Contract” returns true as in Figure 4.9(d). The ReLIC
derived strongest system property is shown in the Figure 4.9(e), in which the syntax cong(p1, p2, p3)
is a Redlog representation of congruences with the non-parametric modulus given by the third
argument. The strongest system property in the integer domain (InS ≤ 10)⇒ (Outs ≤ 4×Ins+12)
is more stringent. This is easily shown to imply the postulated ContractS . In both instances (of
real vs. integer domain), the entire verification process is performed within 1 second on a standard
laptop.
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(a) Verification result in real domain.
(b) The strongest system property derived in real domain.
(c) Counterexample in real domain.
(d) Verification result in integer domain.
(e) The strongest system property derived in integer domain.
Figure 4.9: ReLIC verification results on the illustrative example.
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4.4 ReLIC for time-dependent property composition
Complex systems often exhibit time-dependent features through components such as PID con-
troller, counter, or state-machine. In such cases, a component property can be a constraint over
its input/internal/output variables at different time-steps. The extension of QE-based property
composition to the time-dependent scenarios is not obvious; in fact (4.1) cannot be used as is.
Example 7. In order to see the difficulty encountered in case of time-dependent property com-
position, consider a simple example that consists of cascade of two identical components with in-
put u and output x for the first system, and input x and output y for the second system, and
with properties x > pre(u) and y > pre(x) respectively, in which pre(·) denotes the previous
value function, whereas the cascade connectivity is implied by the common variable x. Then one
can see that the strongest system property is simply the formula, y > pre(pre(u)). Note this fi-
nal formula includes the term pre(pre(u)) that does not appear in the given component prop-
erty formulae, and so a standard quantifier elimination as in (4.1) cannot be employed to ob-
tain the above final formula. Strikingly, if we shift each component property by one time step,
and compose the component properties and their time shifted replicas with the internal variable x,
pre(x), and pre(pre(x)) existentially quantified: ∃x∃pre(x)∃pre(pre(x))((x > pre(u)) ∧ (y >
pre(x)
) ∧ (pre(x) > pre(pre(u))) ∧ (pre(y) > pre(pre(x)))), then upon quantifier elimination,
we do get the desired composed property: y > pre(pre(u)).
4.4.1 Approach to time-dependent property composition
Based on the above simple example, it is clear that the component properties may need to
be time-shifted to match the possibly higher order time-shifts needed for the governing equa-
tions/inequations of the composed system. To formalize the amount of time-shifts required, we
first introduce the notion of component/system order. For a time-dependent component/system,
each internal and output value is governed by the values of itself and of component/system inputs
over a finite history, which can be formulated as a set of difference equations/inequations over the
component/system variables.
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Definition 11. We define component/system order as the difference of maximum and minimum
time-shifts present in its governing difference equations/inequations.
Remark 11. Note that the order as defined above concerns all the component/system relations, and
it is possible that the composition of the equations/inequations results in a lower order input-output
property upon simplification. For example, a system with input u, internal variable x, and output
y can have properties x = u − pre(x) and y = x + pre(x). Then its order by our definition is at
least 1, but the simplified input-output property y = x+ pre(x) = (u− pre(x)) + pre(x) = u is of
zero order.
Consider a component/system with a set of variables X := {x1, . . . , xn} and set of internal
variables Xint := {x1, . . . , xm} ⊆ X, with m ≤ n. Let x(k) denote the variable at the kth time step
with step 0 being the initial step, and for s, t ∈ Z≥0, s ≤ t : X([s, t]) := {x(k)|x ∈ X, k ∈ [s, t]} be
the variables over the time interval [s, t]. If the order of this component/system is less or equal to
M , then its behavior can be summarized by the set of constraints over any interval [k, k + M ] of
M + 1 consecutive time steps for all k ∈ Z≥0:
∧
all constraints over X([k, k +M ]).
Then the formula for its input-output property is given by the existential quantification of all the
internal variables over all the M + 1 time steps:
∃x1(k) . . . ∃x1(k +M) . . . ∃xm(k) . . . ∃xm(k +M)
(∧
all constraints over X([k, k +M ])
)
,
which can be written in a short form as:
∃Xint([k, k +M ])
(∧
all constraints over X([k, k +M ])
)
. (4.4)
The existentially quantified variables can be eliminated by applying QE on (4.4) to obtain a sim-
plified property formula that may be of a lower order than M . As illustrated in the beginning
of Section 4.4, additional time-shifts of component properties may be required before those are
composed. In order to decide the number of time-shifts needed, the order Msys of the composed
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system must be estimated. This is presented in the following theorem which states that an upper
bound for the system order is the sum of all its component orders.
Theorem 7. Given a system S composed of N multi-input-multi-output (MIMO) [99] components,
if the ith component is of order Mi, then
∑N
i=1Mi is an upper bound for the order Msys of S.
Proof. Without loss of generality, pick any two components of S with orders M1 and M2 re-
spectively. Each component possesses a set of properties specified as nonlinear difference equa-
tions/inequations in the general form of f(·) ∼ 0, where ∼∈ {>,≥,=}. For an inequation, we
can introduce a slack variable uf ∼ 0 such that the given difference inequation can equivalently
be written as the conjunction of a difference equation f(·)− uf = 0 and an extra linear constraint
uf ∼ 0. Note this additional constraint is of zero order and hence can not alter the overall order.
For the set of difference equations of component i with Ni inputs (including slack variables)
and Oi outputs, i = 1, 2, it is known that there exists an equivalent state-space representation [99],
and also the number of the state variables equals the order of the component. The general form of
such a state-space representation for component i is:
xi(k + 1) = fi
(
xi(k),ui(k)
)
,
yi(k) = gi
(
xi(k),ui(k)
)
,
where vectors ui (size: Ni × 1), xi (size: Mi × 1), and yi (size : Oi × 1) are respectively the input,
state, and output variable vectors of component i. (The constraints on the added slack variables
also exist, but as noted, do not involve time-shifts and so do not alter the component order.) fi(·)
(size: Mi × 1) and gi(·) (size: Oi × 1) are vectors of functions.
One can simply stack the two state space representations into a single one:x1(k + 1)
x2(k + 1)
 =
f1(x1(k),u1(k))
f2
(
x2(k),u2(k)
)
 ,
y1(k)
y2(k)
 =
g1(x1(k),u1(k))
g2
(
x2(k),u2(k)
)
 .
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It is then clear that the number of states of these, so far unconnected components, equals the sum
of the numbers of states of the two individual components. We claim that when the components are
connected, the state size does not grow, from which the desired result stated in the theorem can be
obtained. A general connectivity relation between two components can be formulated as uc = yc
where uc is a vector of inputs from the union of the two component inputs, and yc is a vector of
outputs from the union of two component outputs. We note that one input can only connect to
one output whereas one output may connect to multiple inputs. Since the overall connected system
can be obtained by iteratively adding one connection at a time, it suffices to show that adding a
single connection does not introduce an additional state variable. For compactness of notation, let
the state-space representation of the combined system be:
x(k + 1) = f
(
x(k),u(k)
)
,
y(k) = g
(
x(k),u(k)
)
,
where the state set has M1 + M2 variables. Suppose a single connection (up, yq) is introduced
within the system, where up ∈ u, yq ∈ y, and up, yq are from different components. Let u′ (resp.
y′) be the vector after removing up (resp. yq) from u (resp. y). Then, we have up(k) = yq(k) =
gq
(
x(k),u(k)
)
= gq
(
x(k),u′(k)
)
with gq ∈ g, and so the state-space representation can be written
as:
x(k + 1) = f
(
x(k),u′(k), gq
(
x(k),u′(k)
))
,
y(k) = g
(
x(k),u′(k), gq
(
x(k),u′(k)
))
.
Then it is easily seen that the updated state-space representation possesses input variables from
u′ (up becomes internal), output variables from y (or y \ {yq} if yq also becomes internal), while
the state-space remains x. (Further simplification and a state-space reduction may be possible.) It
follows that the system order of the connected system remains upper bounded by M1 + M2. The
result of the theorem then follows by iteratively connecting more components to the composition.
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Note any component may be described by a set of properties over its own input, internal, and
output variables (see for example the component CNTRL of the vehicle example in Figure 4.11),
and can be treated as a set of sub-components, each associated with a single property, and with their
connectivity relation implied by their common variables. Hence we have the following corollary:
Corollary 7.1. The order of a component is bounded by the sum of all its property orders. The
system order of S in Theorem 7 is bounded by the sum of all the individual property orders of all
its components.
After the composed system order bound Msys is determined, the i
th individual property of the
components can be replicated Msys−Mi times, where Mi is the order of the ith individual property,
and the jth replica shifted j time-steps (j = 1, . . . ,Msys −Mi) to obtain the set of all constraints
over X([k, k +Msys]). These replicated and time-shifted properties of all the components can then
be composed to deduce the strongest system property:
∃Xint([k, k +Msys])
(∧
all constraints over X([k, k +Msys])
)
, (4.5)
where as before, the existential quantification is w.r.t. the internal variables Xint([k, k +Msys]) of
the system.
Remark 12. When the actual system order Msys is less than the upper bound
∑N
i=1Mi provided by
Theorem 7, the result of the QE in (4.5) will contain the conjunction of
∑N
i=1Mi−Msys redundant
expressions that are the time-shifted replicas of some other conjuncts within the same expression.
Example 8. Consider three properties z = y + x, y = pre(u), and x = pre(w), where x and y
are internal variables. Then, per Theorem 7, the system order upper bound is the sum of the three
subsystem orders: 0 + 1 + 1 = 2. On the other hand, it is easy to see that the composed property
over the external variables z, u, and w is z = y + x = pre(u) + pre(w), which is only of order 1.
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The computation of the composed property using our approach requires shifting each component
by its order difference with the upper bound (2, 1, 1 resp.), and then combining those using (4.5):
∃x(k)∃x(k + 1)∃x(k + 2)∃y(k)∃y(k + 1)∃y(k + 2)((
z(k) = y(k) + x(k)
) ∧ (z(k + 1) = y(k + 1) + x(k + 1)) ∧ (z(k + 2) = y(k + 2) + x(k + 2))
∧ (y(k + 1) = u(k)) ∧ (y(k + 2) = u(k + 1)) ∧ (x(k + 1) = w(k)) ∧ (x(k + 2) = w(k + 1))).
Upon quantifier elimination we obtain:
(
z(k + 1) = u(k) + w(k)
) ∧ (z(k + 2) = u(k + 1) + w(k + 1)),
in which z(k + 2) = u(k + 1)+w(k + 1) is a one-step shifted replica of z(k + 1) = u(k)+w(k), hence
redundant. By expressing the QE result in conjunctive normal form, the redundant expressions can
be readily identified as the time-shifted replicas of some other expressions, and eliminated.
Following a similar approach as described above, we can also obtain the system-level initial
condition by composing the component-level initial conditions. For a system of order Msys, initial
conditions over the first Msys steps (0, . . . ,Msys − 1) suffice. So the system-level initial condition
can be obtained using:
∃Xint([0,Msys − 1])
(∧
all constraints over X([0,Msys − 1])
)
. (4.6)
Example 9. Consider the same example given at the beginning of this section with the component
properties and initial conditions: y > pre(x), y(0) > 0 and x > pre(u), u(0) > 1. Then in this
case, (4.6) is encoded as:
∃y([0, 1])
((
z(0) > 0
) ∧ (z(1) > y(0)) ∧ (y(0) > 1) ∧ (y(1) > x(0))),
which is equivalent to
(
z(0) > 0
) ∧ (z(1) > 1).
Once the system-level property and initial condition are encoded using (4.5) and (4.6) respec-
tively, the verification of a postulated system property can be done using an induction-based proof.
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4.4.2 Implementation and experimental result
The overall approach for time-dependent/temporal property composition and checking the cor-
rectness of a postulated property is summarized in Algorithm 6, whose steps can be understood as
follows:
Algorithm 6: Quantifier elimination-based compositional verification for time-dependent
properties.
Input: System S, set of all variables X := {x1, . . . , xn}, set of internal variables
Xint := {x1, . . . , xm}(m ≤ n), set of connectivity relations C, set of component
properties Φcomp, set of component initial conditions Icomp, postulated system
property φpostl over system inputs and outputs X \Xint.
1 Φall ← Φcomp ∪ {(xkp = xkq )|(xp, xq) ∈ C};
2 Msys ← Σφ∈Φcomp Order(φ);
3 Φall([k, k +Msys])← {Shift(φ, i)|φ ∈ Φall, i ∈ [0,Msys −Order(φ)]};
4 fsys ← Compose
(
X([k, k +Msys]), Xint([k, k +Msys]),Φall([k, k +Msys])
)
;
5 φsys ← Redlog(fsys);
6 Isys ← true;
7 if Icomp 6= ∅ then
8 Iall([0,Msys − 1])← Icomp ∪ Φall([0,Msys − 1]);
9 fsys ← Compose
(
X([0,Msys − 1]), Xint([0,Msys − 1]), Iall([0,Msys − 1])
)
;
10 Isys ← Redlog(fsys);
11 end
12 (result, ce)← k-induction(φsys, Isys, φpostl,K);
Output: result, ce
Line 1 collects the set of all constraints Φall over variables X as the union of component prop-
erties and the constraints from their connectivity relation. Line 2 assigns the system order Msys
with its upper bound computed according to Theorem 7 and its corollary. In Line 3, all the con-
straints over X([k, k +Msys]), denoted Φall([k, k +Msys]), are collected to comprise the set of all
the necessary time-shifted replicas of properties in Φall. The system-level composed property fsys is
obtained in line 4 over X([k, k +Msys]), by internalizing Xint([k, k +Msys]) in Φall([k, k +Msys]) as
in (4.5). The quantifier eliminator tool Redlog then performs QE on fsys to obtain the quantifier-
free formula φsys in line 5. Line 6 initializes the system-level initial condition Isys to true (which is
the default value when there are no component initial conditions). If the component initial condi-
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tion set is non-empty, lines 8-10 are used to derive the quantifier-free system-level initial condition
Isys based on (4.6). In line 12, k-induction based model-checking by QE-integrated JKind checks
whether the strongest system property φsys implies the postulated system property φpostl, and to
obtain the verification result result which could be true, false, or unknown. A counterexample
ce is generated if result is false. Note this inductive proof of the postulated system property is
carried out entirely at the system-level, without having to go back to the component-level, as it is
desired of a compositional reasoning approach.
We extended our prototype tool ReLIC to compose finite-order time-dependent properties (con-
tracts). The extended architecture of ReLIC is shown in Figure 4.10. It utilizes the front-end
infrastructure of the AGREE tool for capturing and parsing the input AADL models and also its
output environment for presenting the results to the console. The “Property Composer” module
computes the upper bound for the system-level order based on Theorem 7 and its corollary and
computes the strongest system-level property (contract). This is then used by the “Induction Ver-
ifier” module to perform induction-based system-level verification of a postulated system property.
Both these modules utilize Redlog as a back-end solver.
Figure 4.10: Architecture of ReLIC.
To demonstrate our tool, we tested it on a vehicle model as shown in Figure 4.11(a). The
vehicle consists of two components, namely, a PID control component “Speed Control” (CNTRL)
and a vehicle throttle “Throttle” (THROT), within a feedback configuration. The dynamics of
“Speed Control” is specified by a set of difference equations involving also certain state variables
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(Figure 4.11(b)), whereas the dynamics of “Throttle” is specified by a difference equation over only
its input and output variables (Figure 4.11(c)). There are three first-order expressions in total:
e int = prev(e, 0.0) + e,
e dot = prev(e, 0.0)− e, and
Actual.val = prev(Actual.val, 0.0) + 0.1 ∗Actuator Input,
where prev(·) is the extended delay operator pre(·) with the second argument denoting the initial
value. The postulated system property is
const tar speed⇒ (Actual Speed.val < 1.0),
where const tar speed is a Boolean variable whose truth indicates system target speed is set to
a constant value 1.0 (see its defining expression in Figure 4.12). The ReLIC inferred strongest
system property (based on (4.5) and (4.6)) contains the system-level difference equation as well as
the initial condition over system input Target Speed.val and system output Actual Speed.val.
While the upper bound for the composed system order is 3, it turns out that the system input-
output property order is only 1 due to the inherent parallelism among the components, as also
computed by our approach (see the encoded expressions and the console output in Figure 4.12):
51 ∗ actual speed− 49 ∗ pre actual speed− pre target speed− target speed = 0,
with the initial condition:
51 ∗ actual speed− target speed = 0
These are easily shown to imply the postulated system property using induction for k = 1, where
the base step and the inductive step are:
(51 ∗ actual speed− target speed = 0)⇒ ((target speed = 1)⇒ (actual speed < 1)), and
(
(51 ∗ actual speed− 49 ∗ pre actual speed− pre target speed− target speed = 0)
∧ (pre target speed = 1) ∧ (pre actual speed < 1))
⇒ ((target speed = pre target speed)⇒ (actual speed < 1)).
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(a) A vehicle model and its components dynamics.
(b) Specification of CNTRL component.
(c) Specification of THROT component.
Figure 4.11: A vehicle model, modified from [2].
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Figure 4.12: ReLIC verification output on the vehicle model.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION
Our work on the formal verification of the model-based cyber-physical systems involves research
over different but related subjects within the compositional verification paradigm. We started from
approaches applied at the component-level to tackle the problems raised by models with complex
transition behaviors and/or nonlinear continuous dynamics. Once the component-level properties
are established, compositional reasoning technique can take over to the next level, i.e., establishing
the system-level properties without looking again into redundant component-level implementation
details. The derived system property further can be used to prove postulated system property to
complete the verification process if the former is more stringent. At each of the three stages of our
work, we developed a prototype tool that implemented our verification algorithms and demonstrated
the capability and efficiency of our approaches.
In Chapter 2, we presented a counterexample fragment based specification relaxation (CEFSR)
approach for the safety verification of linear hybrid automata. While preserving the discrete-time
behaviors, a linear hybrid automaton is translated to an equivalent linear transition system with the
same discrete transition graph. The abstract model of the linear transition system, i.e., its discrete
transition graph, is model checked against the safety specification to find a counterexample in each
iteration. Feasibility analysis of a counterexample in the concrete model is conducted by solving the
set of constraints collected along the counterexample path in the concrete model and compacted
to find an unsatisfiable core. We also explained the way to encode the unsatisfiable core of a
spurious counterexample and to use it to relax the current specification. The relaxed specification
eliminates all counterexamples possessing the same unsatisfiable core in a single iteration. The
above approach is implemented in our prototype verifier LhaVrf , integrated with the state-of-the-
art symbolic model checker NuSMV and SMT solver Z3. The verifier accepts a set of input files
containing the constituent linear hybrid automata written in an easy-to-specify textual syntax. In
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case of termination, the verifier outputs a concrete counterexample that reaches an unsafe location,
or reports that safety is satisfied. Since the reachability problem for LHAs is undecidable, there is
no a priori guarantee of termination (as is the case with any hybrid system verifier). The scalability
of the tool is demonstrated by applying it to an instance of Fischers mutual exclusion protocol with
10 processes (containing approximately 1 million discrete locations and 13 million transition edges).
In Chapter 3, we presented an on-the-fly dynamic repartitioning based scheme, integrated into
a simulation-based approach for over-approximating of the bounded-time reachability of hybrid
systems. The dynamic, on-the-fly partitioning not only helps limit the over-approximation error,
but also extends the applicability to general hybrid systems. Prior simulation-based approach did
not possess such generality because the occurrence of new discrete transitions in the states reached
within the simulation error bound. As a result, the usage of prior simulation-based verification
approaches has remained limited to either continuous dynamical systems (with no discrete jumps),
or to switched systems subject to time-driven switching with predefined switching signals, or to
hybrid systems with strict assumptions on state continuity, and location consistency among simu-
lation and execution traces. Our development shows that the computation of the reachable set is
guaranteed to be reliable in each of the simulation time-steps. This is then used to generate the
reliable simulation seeds of the next time-steps. Thereby, the reliability of simulation trajectory in
over-approximating the reachability is maintained. Meanwhile, our algorithm performs state repar-
tition at each discrete transition, so that it can handle general hybrid systems with guard/reset
predicates, thereby allowing state-triggered discrete transitions. Our approach also contributed to
error growth control. In order to alleviate the exponential rate of error growth of the tubes, our
approach periodically partitions the reachable set, which converges for convergent dynamics. As a
result, the number of running simulations is dynamically decided in run-time. It may even decrease
compared to the initial number for a convergent dynamics. These are not guaranteed for many
of the existing tools as shown by our example. For certain type of convergent systems, we pro-
vided convergent bounds on trajectory deviation, even for using simple to compute Lipschitz-based
discrepancy functions. As a result, for systems that exhibit convergent behaviors, system safety
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over infinite horizon may be also assured as witnessed in Figure 3.10. Another novel feature of
our approach is that it supports systems with certain types of inputs (i.e., open systems). Finally,
we also presented the implementation of our prototype tool (HS3V) which employs the proposed
algorithms, and experiment results reporting improvements on a variety of benchmarks.
Compositional reasoning is central to scaling model-based approaches for establishing correct-
ness. In Chapter 4, we showed that the foundational principle underlying the compositional rea-
soning is Quantifier Elimination (QE). Within our compositional verification framework, QE was
used to derive the strongest system property from the given components properties and their con-
nectivity relation. This simplifies the compositional verification into two fixed steps, independent
of the number of components, and also reduces the number of variables needed in the proof of the
postulated system properties, thus improving the efficiency of compositional reasoning. We further
extended our property composition framework to support the composition of time-dependent prop-
erties. This is a foundational step towards compositional reasoning of systems with “memory”.
The extension developed a new procedure to determine the system order, given the component
orders, which we implemented in our prototype tool ReLIC that uses AGREE at the front-end for
model input and result output, and Redlog at the back-end for performing QE. Within this tool,
we also implemented the QE procedure to infer the system-level property that incorporates time-
dependence. The proof of a postulated system-level property involves induction, which is also
supported in ReLIC. Aside from property composition using QE, we showed that certain formal
verification steps can also be viewed as QE problems. Thereby, the QE tools provide options to
also extend the existing verification tools (like the compositional reasoning tools). In order to take
advantage of QE’s ability of solving the satisfiability problem over first-order logic, we integrated
the QE tool Redlog as a back-end solver, in parallel with the existing SMT solvers, for the k-
induction based model-checker JKind, enhancing the later’s capability to model-check nonlinear
properties. Our QE-integrated JKind was able to resolve a fuzzy logic problem involving non-linear
computation efficiently, whereas the SMT-integrated version was unable to terminate, showing the
extended capability for model-checking provided by QE.
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